

ORIGINAL

# TRANSCRIPT OF PROCEEDINGS

UNITED STATES SENATE

AND

U. S. HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES

Congressional Task Force on Afghanistan

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OPEN HEARING OF THE CONGRESSIONAL TASK  
FORCE ON AFGHANISTAN TO REVIEW THE UNI-  
TED NATIONS SPONSORED PROXIMITY PEACE  
TALKS ON AFGHANISTAN.

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Washington, D. C.  
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TUESDAY, FEBRUARY 17, 1987

United States Senate  
and U. S. House of Representatives,  
Congressional Task Force on Afghanistan,  
Washington, D. C.

The Task Force met, pursuant to notice, at 10:01 a.m. in Room 628 of the Dirksen Senate Office Building, Hon. Gordon J. Humphrey, Chairman, presiding.

Present: Senator Humphrey, Representative Levin.

Senator Humphrey. Good morning, shall we begin? This is the seventh hearing of the Congressional Task Force on Afghanistan, the first of the 100th Congress. The focus of our hearing this morning is the talks now under way seeking to reach a settlement of the war in Afghanistan--I am referring, of course, to the U.N.-mediated talks which have been under way for some years, and also the new bilateral talks between Moscow and Islamabad.

There is little doubt, in my mind at least, that the Soviets are now seeking to achieve at the bargaining table what they have failed to achieve through seven years of war

against the people of Afghanistan. There is little doubt, in my mind at least, that there is a potential for a sell-out of the Afghan people and their case in the course of these various talks.

And so it seems to be incumbent upon the friends of Afghanistan to pay close attention now, particularly since the legitimate representatives of the Afghan people have been systematically excluded from either of these talks now under way.

[Statement follows:]

STATEMENT OF HON. FRED C. IKLE, UNDER  
SECRETARY OF DEFENSE FOR POLICY

Senator Humphrey. Our first witness was to have been Senator Byrd, but he will be delayed for some time, so we turn now to our second witness, Dr. Fred Ikle, Under Secretary of Defense.

Dr. Ikle?

Dr. Ikle. Senator Humphrey, it's a distinct pleasure really to have been asked to appear before you. Your Task Force and these hearings, and also the Majority Leader's statement this morning, I think demonstrate the strong bipartisan concern for the struggle of the Afghan people against this cruel foreign occupation.

Senator, I propose to summarize my opening statement and submit it for the record.

Recently, as you stated, Senator, the question of a negotiated settlement has been raised by the Soviets, and whenever Soviet leaders launch some kind of a peace offensive, other governments tend to indulge in a great deal of speculation as to the seriousness of the Soviet proposal.

Unfortunately, it appears that the Soviet leadership has not yet come to the realization that their occupation forces must quickly withdraw. More likely, the Soviet initiatives represent, as you just stated, an attempted deception. I find it encouraging that the Senate, in this 100th Congress,

in one of its very first actions, clearly rejected this kind of deception with its resolution, passed by 92 to 0, in support of the Afghan freedom fighters.

Moscow is pursuing a long-term policy with the objective to outlast the resistance by destroying its support base, and that strategy has two components, one directed toward the Afghan people within Afghanistan, and one aimed at the outside world.

Within Afghanistan the Soviets have pursued a policy that has accurately been described as "migratory genocide." They have not tried to seize and hold territory, with the exception of the large cities, but to subjugate the population, either by chasing them out of the country, killing it, or, where feasible, co-optation.

Now, the other component of the Soviet policy, the one directed to the outside world, has sought from the very beginning to create a lack of awareness about this war, so as to curtail the outside support. In fact, I would say the Soviet objectives in the long term depend on the outside world neglecting the Soviet war against the Afghan people. There are many ways in which the Soviets have tried to bring this about. You may recall, Senator, the Soviet ambassador in Pakistan threatened journalists who would go into Afghanistan that they would be killed. He said our units--referring to the Soviet units in Afghanistan--will help the Afghan

forces, the Afghan government forces, to kill the journalists.

However, what has really transpired within Afghanistan has not gone according to the Soviet plans in all these seven years. To be sure, the population in Afghanistan was reduced by at least a third of its pre-invasion size. But the people remaining have not been demoralized, weakened, and they have not reduced the armed opposition. The opposite has happened, the resistance is more effective, better equipped, and they are inflicting increasing casualties and materiel losses on the Soviet and Afghan government communist forces, including significant aircraft losses.

Also, cooperation among the freedom fighters has increased substantially. Political coordination, both within and outside of Afghanistan, has improved. The Mujahideen alliance is functioning better. In fact, it was easily able very quickly to reject the Soviet recent deceptive proposals on negotiated withdrawal.

So Moscow must have realized that under current conditions it cannot win, it cannot even make meaningful progress. Yet this realization has not led the Soviet leadership to consider genuine disengagement. Despite all its statements and its alleged desire to withdraw, it has not moved from its two key demands: to eliminate the ability of the Mujahideen to resist the occupation before Soviet troop withdrawals

begin, and to keep its own colonial regime indefinitely in power. They have not made progress in this because the international support for the cause of the Afghan freedom fighters, far from diminishing, has grown with each passing year. And this is worldwide, not just in the United States.

The seven years of warfare against the Afghan people put the Soviet Union at odds with virtually all the countries of the world. The yearly United Nations resolutions condemning the Soviet invasion carry with huge majorities--the latest by a vote of 120 to 20. The Islamic countries have similarly voiced their opposition to the Soviet war in Afghanistan, and have repeatedly asked for Soviet withdrawal. Just recently, the fifth Islamic summit conference in Kuwait again restated that principled stand. Forty-six Islamic leaders were not deceived by the Soviet initiatives; they passed a stronger condemnation against Soviet warfare than ever before and called for all Islamic states to support the freedom fighters.

Now, at this point I would be remiss, Senator Humphrey, if I did not mention the courageous and praiseworthy role played by Pakistan. To begin with, the government and the people of Pakistan, despite considerable economic and political costs, have extended a most generous welcome to the Afghan refugees, the largest refugee population in the world. Pakistan has been second to none in seeking every possible



avenue for a just and fair negotiated settlement. We in the United States support, and continue to support, its efforts in this regard. The government and the people of Pakistan have stood up with great courage and resilience against continued Soviet pressures, attempts at intimidation, and subversion.

And the United States views most seriously such Soviet attempts, including violations of Pakistan air space and territory. I am sure, Senator, I am also speaking for Congress by saying that the United States stands by the government and people of Pakistan and is committed to the territorial integrity of Pakistan.

Our security assistance to Pakistan is essential in this regard. I want to stress the great significance of congressional approval here for the requested second multi-year security assistance program for Pakistan.

We believe--and there is a unanimous view here, I understand, with Congress, the executive branch, and all these other countries, that the conflict in Afghanistan has to be solved consistent with the U.N. resolutions and result in a prompt, complete, and irrevocable withdrawal of Soviet forces. No more time is required for this withdrawal than it took for the initial Soviet invasion. And any settlement will have to have the broad support of the Afghan people. So a communist-front government is not acceptable. And the true

test of national conciliation will be the voluntary return of the refugees.

It's our hope that the Soviet leaders will recognize sooner rather than later that the Soviet empire cannot win in Afghanistan, that colonial-imperial wars of the sort being waged there are a thing of the past, that a settlement fair to all the parties is more easily attained now than later, that the costs to Moscow, whether in Afghanistan or throughout the world, or even within the Soviet Union, will continue to grow.

It is sometimes alleged that the Soviet Union might be worried about a hostile military presence in Afghanistan. Of course, before the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan, that country was a friendly neighbor of the Soviet Union, there was no threat at all. Today, the restoration of an independent, non-threatening Afghanistan is still up to Moscow.

But if the Soviet leaders persist in waging war against the Afghan people, the day may come when their allegation of a threat across the Soviet-Afghan border might have been turned into a self-fulfilling prophecy. Moscow should seriously ponder this risk. This is a very important consideration, Senator.

Let me conclude by reiterating our hope that the Soviet Union will soon come to the realization that it must withdraw and permit a just and fair negotiated settlement. If Moscow

truly wants peace, it must show this by deeds. And as for us, we will stand by our Afghan friends until just peace is attained.

Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

[Statement follows:]

STATEMENT BY THE HONORABLE FRED C. IKLE  
UNDER SECRETARY OF DEFENSE FOR POLICY  
BEFORE THE  
JOINT TASK FORCE ON AFGHANISTAN  
FEBRUARY 17, 1987

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MR. CHAIRMAN, MEMBERS OF THE TASK FORCE ON AFGHANISTAN:  
IT IS A DISTINCT PLEASURE TO HAVE BEEN ASKED TO APPEAR BEFORE  
YOU. THESE HEARINGS, AND IN PARTICULAR THE MAJORITY LEADER'S  
ELOQUENT STATEMENT, DEMONSTRATE OUR STRONG, BIPARTISAN  
CONCERN FOR THE STRUGGLE OF THE AFGHAN PEOPLE AGAINST THE CRUEL  
FOREIGN OCCUPATION.

ONE PURPOSE OF THESE HEARINGS, AS I UNDERSTAND IT, IS TO  
THROW LIGHT ON THE CURRENT FLURRY OF DIPLOMATIC ACTIVITY SURROUNDING  
THE QUESTION OF A NEGOTIATED SETTLEMENT. WHENEVER SOVIET LEADERS  
LAUNCH ONE OF THEIR "PEACE OFFENSIVES," OTHER ~~WESTERN~~ GOVERNMENTS  
TEND TO INDULGE IN A GREAT DEAL OF SPECULATION AS TO THE SERIOUSNESS  
OF THE SOVIET PROPOSALS. ALL OF US WISH TO SEE AN END TO THE  
BARBARIC WARFARE THAT MOSCOW HAS BEEN INFLECTING ON THE AFGHAN  
PEOPLE. HENCE THE TEMPTATION IS GREAT TO BELIEVE THAT THE SOVIETS  
ARE FINALLY READY TO WITHDRAW.

UNFORTUNATELY, IT APPEARS THE SOVIET LEADERSHIP HAS NOT YET  
COME TO THE REALIZATION THAT THEIR OCCUPATION FORCES MUST QUICKLY  
WITHDRAW. MORE LIKELY, CURRENT SOVIET INITIATIVES REPRESENT A  
THINLY DISGUISED ATTEMPT AT DECEPTION. DECEPTION MUST BE EXPOSED.  
IT IS ENCOURAGING TO SEE THAT THE SENATE, IN ONE OF ITS VERY

FIRST ACTIONS IN THE NEW SESSION, DID JUST THAT THROUGH ITS RESOLUTION ON AFGHANISTAN, ADOPTED BY A VOTE OF 92 TO 0. HAD THOSE ABSENT BEEN THERE TO VOTE, I HAVE NO DOUBT THIS WOULD HAVE BEEN UNANIMOUS. WE ALL OWE A DEBT OF GRATITUDE TO SENATORS BYRD AND HUMPHREY FOR THEIR LEADERSHIP IN INTRODUCING THAT RESOLUTION.

THE RESOLUTION APTLY DESCRIBES THE SOVIET INITIATIVES AS "A CYNICAL AND HYPOCRITICAL PUBLIC RELATIONS CAMPAIGN," AS REFLECTING "THE APPARENT BELIEF THAT WORDS WILL SUBSTITUTE FOR GENUINE ACTION IN SHAPING WORLD OPINION." THE RESOLUTION SUMS UP SOVIET OBJECTIVES WHEN IT SAYS, AND I QUOTE: "THE OFFER BY THE SOVIET PUPPET REGIME IN KABUL FOR A CEASE-FIRE AND AMNESTY IN THE NAME OF NATIONAL RECONCILIATION IS A TRANSPARENT ATTEMPT TO ISOLATE THE DEMOCRATIC RESISTANCE (THE MUJAHEDIN), CONFUSE THE POPULACE AND ACCOMPLISH THE SURRENDER OF THE DEMOCRATIC RESISTANCE WHILE THE SOVIET MILITARY OCCUPATION CONTINUES UNABATED."

SOVIET "PEACE" INITIATIVES, WHETHER IN THE CONTEXT OF AFGHANISTAN OR ELSEWHERE, ARE NOT NEW. WHAT IS NEW IN THE CURRENT SOVIET INITIATIVES ON AFGHANISTAN IS THE SCALE AND SOPHISTICATION OF THE EFFORT.

THESE INITIATIVES CAN BE TRACED BACK TO TO GORBACHEV'S ACCESSION TO POWER. VAGUE REFERENCES AT THE GENEVA SUMMIT OF A NEED TO END THE WAR IN AFGHANISTAN AND GORBACHEV'S DESCRIPTION OF AFGHANISTAN AT THE 27TH COMMUNIST PARTY CONGRESS AS A "BLEEDING WOUND," WERE AMONG THE INITIAL SALVOS OF THIS CAMPAIGN. THESE MOVES SUCCEEDED IN STIRRING SOME SPECULATION THAT PERHAPS A CHANGE WAS AFOOT IN SOVIET POLICY, THAT PERHAPS MOSCOW WAS GETTING

TIRED AFTER SEVEN YEARS OF WARFARE AND WAS LOOKING FOR A WAY OUT. FURTHER SOVIET INITIATIVES, INCLUDING THE PRESENT SERIES AND A SUCCESSION OF APPARENT CHANGES IN MOSCOW'S POSITION ON DISCUSSION OF WITHDRAWAL TIMETABLES, HAVE BEEN TAILORED TO PRODUCE WHAT I WOULD CALL THE "ILLUSION OF MOVEMENT."

MOSCOW IS PURSUING A LONG TERM POLICY WHOSE OBJECTIVE IS TO OUTLAST THE RESISTANCE BY DESTROYING ITS SUPPORT BASE. THAT POLICY HAS TWO BASIC COMPONENTS, ONE DIRECTED TOWARD AFGHANISTAN ITSELF, ONE AIMED AT THE OUTSIDE WORLD. WITHIN AFGHANISTAN, THE SOVIETS HAVE PURSUED A POLICY THAT HAS ACCURATELY BEEN DESCRIBED AS "MIGRATORY GENOCIDE." THE SOVIETS HAVE NOT TRIED TO SEIZE AND HOLD TERRITORY, BUT TO SUBJUGATE THE POPULATION EITHER BY CHASING IT OUT OF THE COUNTRY, KILLING IT, OR, WHERE FEASIBLE BY CO-OPTATION.

THE OTHER COMPONENT OF SOVIET POLICY ON AFGHANISTAN, THE ONE DIRECTED TO THE OUTSIDE WORLD, HAS SOUGHT FROM THE VERY BEGINNING TO CREATE A LACK OF AWARENESS ABOUT THE WAR, SO AS TO CURTAIL OUTSIDE SUPPORT FOR THE RESISTANCE. SOVIET OBJECTIVES IN FACT DEPEND UPON INDUCING THE OUTSIDE WORLD TO NEGLECT THE SOVIET WAR AGAINST THE AFGHAN PEOPLE.

TO THIS END, ASIDE FROM "PEACE" OFFENSIVES, MOSCOW HAS ALSO USED BLUNTER MEANS TO DISCOURAGE INTEREST IN THE WAR. JUST ONE EXAMPLE: ON OCTOBER 5, 1984, THE SOVIET AMBASSADOR TO PAKISTAN PUBLICLY WARNED INDEPENDENT JOURNALISTS THAT THEY WOULD BE KILLED IF THEY TRIED TO GO INTO AFGHANISTAN. HIS WORDS ARE WORTH QUOTING. HE SAID: "I WARN YOU, AND THROUGH YOU, ALL OF YOUR JOURNALIST COLLEAGUES: STOP TRYING TO PENETRATE AFGHANISTAN WITH THE SO-CALLED

MUJAHEDIN. FROM NOW ON, THE BANDITS AND THE SO-CALLED JOURNALISTS--FRENCH, AMERICAN, BRITISH, AND OTHERS--ACCOMPANYING THEM WILL BE KILLED. AND OUR UNITS IN AFGHANISTAN WILL HELP THE AFGHAN FORCES TO DO IT."\*

WHAT HAS TRANSPIRED ON THE GROUND HAS NOT GONE ACCORDING TO SOVIET PLANS, HOWEVER. IN FACT, IT COULD BE SAID THAT WITH REGARD TO SEVERAL KEY ELEMENTS, SOVIET STRATEGY HAS FAILED, OR IS FAILING, TO ACHIEVE ITS OBJECTIVES.

TO BE SURE, THE SOVIETS HAVE SUCCEEDED IN REDUCING THE POPULATION OF AFGHANISTAN BY A GOOD THIRD OF ITS PRE-INVASION SIZE. THEY HAVE DESTROYED PARTS OF THE COUNTRY, AND IN PLACES DEPRIVED THE RESISTANCE OF ITS LOCAL SUPPORT BASE, OF ITS SOURCE OF FOOD AND OTHER NEEDED SUPPLIES. YET, EVEN THIS HAS NOT BEEN ENTIRELY ONE-SIDED, FOR THE MUJAHEDIN NO LONGER HAVE TO FEAR BARBARIC RETALIATION UPON LOCAL VILLAGERS FOR THEIR ATTACKS ON SOVIET AND AFGHAN PUPPET FORCES.

BUT WHEREAS MOSCOW HAD HOPED TO DEMORALIZE, WEAKEN, AND OTHERWISE REDUCE ARMED OPPOSITION, THE OPPOSITE HAS HAPPENED. THE AFGHAN RESISTANCE IS NOW MORE EFFECTIVE, BETTER EQUIPPED THAN EVER BEFORE. THEY ARE INFLECTING INCREASING CASUALTIES AND MATERIEL LOSSES UPON SOVIET AND AFGHAN COMMUNIST FORCES, INCLUDING SIGNIFICANT LOSSES IN AIRCRAFT. COOPERATION AMONG THE FREEDOM FIGHTERS INSIDE AFGHANISTAN HAS INCREASED SUBSTANTIALLY. THERE ARE NOW AREAS WHERE COMMANDERS FROM SEVERAL DIFFERENT LOCALITIES AND GROUPS COOPERATE WELL WITH EACH OTHER. POLITICAL COOPERATION

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\* Remarks were made by the Ambassador, Vitaly Smirnov, to Olivier Warin of French television and the Agence France Press correspondent in Islamabad.

AND COORDINATION, BOTH IN AFGHANISTAN AND AMONG THE GROUPS IN PAKISTAN, HAS ALSO IMPROVED. THE MUJAHEDIN ALLIANCE OF THE DIFFERENT GROUPS IS FUNCTIONING BETTER. IN FACT, IT EASILY AGREED UNANIMOUSLY TO REJECT THE DECEPTIVE SOVIET PROPOSALS.

THE SOVIETS HAD CLEARLY HOPED TO STRENGTHEN THE COMMUNIST REGIME IN KABUL AND MAKE THE AFGHAN CAPITAL AND THE MAJOR CITIES SECURE FROM RESISTANCE ATTACKS. THEY HAD HOPED GRADUALLY TO REPLACE SOVIET WITH AFGHAN COMMUNIST FORCES IN COMBAT ROLES, AND GENERALLY TO INCREASE SUPPORT FOR THE SOVIET INSTALLED REGIME.

THE SOVIETS HAVE ACHIEVED NONE OF THESE OBJECTIVES. ON THE CONTRARY, SEVEN YEARS AFTER THE INVASION, AFGHAN FORCES CONTINUE TO PERFORM POORLY AGAINST THE MUJAHEDIN. MORALE IS BAD AMONG THE PUPPET FORCES AND DESERTION RATES CONTINUE TO BE HIGH.

MOSCOW MUST HAVE REALIZED THAT UNDER CURRENT CONDITIONS NOT ONLY CAN IT NOT WIN, IT CANNOT EVEN MAKE MEANINGFUL PROGRESS. UNFORTUNATELY, THIS REALIZATION HAS NOT YET LED THE SOVIET LEADERSHIP TO CONSIDER DISENGAGEMENT. ALWAYS CONSCIOUS OF THE SIGNIFICANCE OF OUTSIDE SUPPORT TO THE RESISTANCE, MOSCOW HAS APPARENTLY DETERMINED THAT THIS SUPPORT IS THE REAL OBSTACLE TO THE INCORPORATION OF AFGHANISTAN INTO THE SOVIET EMPIRE. WITH AN ASSURED SOURCE OF EXTERNAL SUPPORT THE AFGHAN RESISTANCE CANNOT BE SUBJUGATED. WITHOUT SUCH SUPPORT MOSCOW COULD GO ABOUT ITS GRISLY BUSINESS MUCH MORE CONFIDENT OF ULTIMATE SUCCESS.

MOSCOW IS AWARE THAT ONCE DEMOCRACIES LOSE INTEREST IN A CAUSE AND DISENGAGE, IT IS ONLY WITH GREAT DIFFICULTY, IF AT ALL, THAT THEY CAN RENEW THEIR COMMITMENT. THE GORBACHEV LEADERSHIP HAS MADE ITS OBJECTIVE FOR AFGHANISTAN TO DISCONNECT THE RESISTANCE



FROM THE OUTSIDE WORLD. DESPITE ALL ITS STATEMENTS ON ITS ALLEGED DESIRE TO WITHDRAW, IT HAS NOT YET MOVED FROM ITS KEY DEMANDS: TO ELIMINATE THE ABILITY OF THE MUJAHEDIN TO RESIST THE SOVIET OCCUPATION BEFORE SOVIET TROOP WITHDRAWALS BEGIN, AND TO KEEP ITS ONLY COLONIAL REGIME INDEFINITELY IN POWER. THIS DEMAND HAS NOT BEEN RESTRICTED TO CESSATION OF EXTERNAL SUPPORT. MOSCOW IS ALSO DEMANDING GUARANTEES THAT SUCH AID NOT BE RESUMED. IN OTHER WORDS, THE SOVIET UNION ASKS THE WEST TO ABANDON THE AFGHAN FREEDOM FIGHTERS AND TO ALLOW SOVIET CONQUEST.

IT SHOULD HAVE BECOME OBVIOUS TO THE SOVIET LEADERSHIP BY NOW THAT THIS ATTEMPT TO HOODWINK THE OUTSIDE WORLD IS, AND WILL REMAIN, A FAILURE. INTERNATIONAL SUPPORT FOR THE CAUSE OF AFGHAN FREEDOM, FAR FROM DIMINISHING, HAS GROWN WITH EACH PASSING YEAR. THIS IS TRUE WORLDWIDE, NOT JUST IN THE UNITED STATES AND IN WESTERN EUROPE.

THE SEVEN YEARS OF WARFARE AGAINST THE AFGHAN PEOPLE PUT THE SOVIET UNION AT ODDS WITH VIRTUALLY ALL THE COUNTRIES OF THE WORLD. THE YEARLY UNITED NATIONS RESOLUTIONS CONDEMNING THE SOVIET INVASION CARRY BY HUGE MAJORITIES, THE LATEST BY A VOTE OF 122 TO 20. ISLAMIC COUNTRIES HAVE SIMILARLY VOICED THEIR OPPOSITION TO SOVIET WAR AGAINST AFGHANISTAN, AND HAVE REPEATEDLY ASKED FOR SOVIET WITHDRAWAL. THE FIFTH ISLAMIC SUMMIT CONFERENCE, JUST HELD IN KUWAIT, ONCE AGAIN RESTATED THAT PRINCIPLED STAND. FORTY-SIX ISLAMIC LEADERS WERE NOT DECEIVED BY THE SOVIET INITIATIVES; THEY PASSED A STRONGER CONDEMNATION OF THE SOVIET WARFARE THAN EVER BEFORE AND CALLED ON ALL ISLAMIC STATES TO SUPPORT THE FREEDOM FIGHTERS. THE COMMITMENT TO THE CAUSE OF AFGHAN FREEDOM HAS

CONTINUED TO GROW THROUGHOUT THE WORLD.

I WOULD BE REMISS IF I DID NOT AT THIS POINT MENTION THE COURAGEOUS AND PRAISEWORTHY ROLE PLAYED BY PAKISTAN. TO BEGIN WITH, THE GOVERNMENT AND PEOPLE OF PAKISTAN, DESPITE CONSIDERABLE ECONOMIC AND POLITICAL COSTS, HAVE EXTENDED A MOST GENEROUS WELCOME TO THE AFGHAN REFUGEES, THE LARGEST REFUGEE POPULATION IN THE WORLD. PAKISTAN HAS BEEN SECOND TO NONE IN SEEKING EVERY POSSIBLE AVENUE FOR A JUST AND FAIR NEGOTIATED SETTLEMENT. WE HAVE SUPPORTED, AND CONTINUE TO SUPPORT ITS EFFORTS IN THIS REGARD. THE GOVERNMENT AND PEOPLE OF PAKISTAN HAVE STOOD UP WITH GREAT COURAGE AND RESILIENCE AGAINST CONTINUED SOVIET PRESSURES, ATTEMPTS AT INTIMIDATION, AND SUBVERSION. THE UNITED STATES VIEWS MOST SERIOUSLY SUCH SOVIET ATTEMPTS, INCLUDING VIOLATIONS OF PAKISTANI AIR SPACE AND TERRITORY. I AM SURE I AM ALSO SPEAKING FOR CONGRESS BY SAYING THAT THE UNITED STATES STANDS BY THE GOVERNMENT AND PEOPLE OF PAKISTAN AND IS COMMITTED TO THE TERRITORIAL INTEGRITY OF PAKISTAN. OUR SECURITY ASSISTANCE PROGRAM TO PAKISTAN REFLECTS THE VITAL AMERICAN INTEREST IN THE SAFETY AND INTEGRITY OF THAT ALLY. I WANT TO STRESS IN THIS REGARD THE GREAT SIGNIFICANCE OF CONGRESSIONAL APPROVAL FOR THE REQUESTED SECOND MULTI-YEAR SECURITY ASSISTANCE PROGRAM FOR PAKISTAN. NO COUNTRY HAS DONE MORE, OR SUFFERED MORE, FOR AFGHANISTAN THAN PAKISTAN. IT DESERVES OUR STRONG AND CONTINUED SUPPORT.

WE BELIEVE THAT A SETTLEMENT TO THE AFGHAN CONFLICT WILL HAVE TO BE CONSISTENT WITH UN RESOLUTIONS AND RESULT IN THE PROMPT, COMPLETE, AND IRREVOCABLE WITHDRAWAL OF SOVIET TROOPS. NO MORE

TIME IS REQUIRED FOR SUCH WITHDRAWAL THAN IT TOOK FOR THE INITIAL SOVIET INVASION. AND ANY SETTLEMENT WILL HAVE TO HAVE THE BROAD SUPPORT OF THE AFGHAN PEOPLE; A COMMUNIST FRONT GOVERNMENT IS THUS NOT ACCEPTABLE. THE TRUE TEST OF NATIONAL RECONCILIATION WILL BE THE VOLUNTARY RETURN OF THE REFUGEES.

IT IS OUR HOPE THAT THE SOVIET LEADERS WILL RECOGNIZE SOONER, RATHER THAN LATER, THAT THE SOVIET EMPIRE CANNOT WIN IN AFGHANISTAN; THAT COLONIAL AND IMPERIAL WARS OF THE SORT BEING WAGED ARE A THING OF THE PAST; THAT A SETTLEMENT FAIR TO ALL THE PARTIES IS MORE EASILY ATTAINED NOW THAN LATER; THAT THE COSTS TO MOSCOW, WHETHER IN AFGHANISTAN, THROUGHOUT THE WORLD, OR EVEN WITHIN THE SOVIET UNION WILL CONTINUE TO GROW UNTIL THEY BECOME TRULY AWESOME.

IT IS SOMETIMES ALLEGED THAT THE SOVIET UNION MIGHT BE WORRIED ABOUT HOSTILE MILITARY PRESENCE IN AFGHANISTAN. OF COURSE, BEFORE THE SOVIET INVASION OF AFGHANISTAN, THAT COUNTRY WAS A FRIENDLY NEIGHBOR OF THE SOVIET UNION, THERE WAS NO THREAT AT ALL. TODAY, THE RESTORATION OF AN INDEPENDENT, NON-THREATENING AFGHANISTAN IS STILL UP TO MOSCOW. BUT IF THE SOVIET LEADERS PERSIST IN WAGING WAR AGAINST THE AFGHAN PEOPLE, THE DAY MAY COME WHEN THEIR ALLEGATION OF A THREAT ACROSS THE SOVIET-AFGHAN BORDER MIGHT HAVE BEEN TURNED INTO A SELF-FULFILLING PROPHECY. MOSCOW SHOULD SERIOUSLY PONDER THIS RISK.

WITHOUT WANTING TO MAKE MORE OF THIS THAN IS WARRANTED AT THIS POINT, THERE IS ALSO MOUNTING EVIDENCE THAT SOVIET AGGRESSION IN AFGHANISTAN IS HAVING AN IMPACT WITHIN THE SOVIET UNION, ESPECIALLY IN MUSLIM SOVIET CENTRAL ASIA. IN REMARKS MADE RECENTLY

IN UZBEKISTAN, GORBACHEV SHARPLY CRITICIZED "COMMUNISTS AND SENIOR OFFICIALS" FOR PAYING "LIP SERVICE" TO COMMUNIST "MORALITY AND IDEALS WHILE ... PERSONALLY PARTICIPATING IN RELIGIOUS RITUALS." THIS, WHEN JUXTAPOSED TO THE FACT THAT EARLY IN THE WAR THE SOVIETS HAD TO WITHDRAW FROM COMBAT THEIR MUSLIM CENTRAL ASIANS BECAUSE OF FRATERNIZATION WITH THEIR AFGHAN CORELIGIONISTS, WHEN JUXTAPOSED TO THE CLEAR SYMPATHY FOR THE LATTER BY CENTRAL ASIANS IN GENERAL, SEEMS TO INDICATE THAT SOVIET LACK OF PROGRESS IN AFGHANISTAN MAY BE INFLUENCING THE STRENGTH OF MUSLIM RELIGIOUS FEELING WITHIN THE SOVIET UNION. THE IMPLICATIONS OF YET FURTHER FRUITLESS BLOODSHED SHOULD BE CLEAR.

LET ME CONCLUDE BY REITERATING OUR HOPE THAT THE SOVIET UNION WILL SOON CONCLUDE THAT THE OPPORTUNITY FOR A JUST AND FAIR NEGOTIATED SETTLEMENT, ONE THAT INCLUDES THE FREEDOM FIGHTERS' PARTICIPATION IN THE DETERMINATION OF THEIR FUTURE, SHOULD BE GRASPED NOW. OUTSIDE SUPPORT AND SUSTENANCE FOR THE VALIANT AFGHANS WILL NOT GO AWAY. THE COST TO MOSCOW WILL ONLY INCREASE WITHOUT HOPE OF VICTORY. IF MOSCOW TRULY WANTS PEACE, IT MUST SHOW THIS BY DEEDS. AS FOR US, WE WILL STAND BY OUR AFGHAN FRIENDS UNTIL JUST PEACE IS ATTAINED.

THANK YOU.

1 Senator Humphrey. Thank you, Dr. Ikle. As you know, in  
2 the last several weeks there has been a flurry of diplomatic  
3 initiatives on the part of the Soviets and their puppet  
4 government in Kabul, their puppet regime, I should say.

5 Do you see any sincerity at all in those initiatives, or  
6 are they purely political moves, propaganda efforts?

7 Dr. Ikle. At this time they are designed to discourage  
8 outside support, to divert the outside attention to what goes  
9 on in Afghanistan, and the Soviets are not prepared to with-  
10 draw and permit an independent Afghan government at this  
11 time.

12 Senator Humphrey. Do you see any cause for concern  
13 about a sell-out arising from these talks at some point?

14 Dr. Ikle. I do not. I mentioned in my opening remarks  
15 the strong support of the Islamic summit meeting, the United  
16 Nations, and, above all, the Pakistani people and the Pakis-  
17 tani government, the United States Congress, western European  
18 countries--over a hundred countries are supporting the Afghan  
19 freedom fighters.

20 Senator Humphrey. Yes, to be sure. Nonetheless, let me  
21 share my concern with you. If, for instance, the talks  
22 mediated by the United Nations were to successfully conclude,  
23 that is, to produce agreements, my concern is that if the  
24 withdrawal timetable, which is supposed to be the sole  
25 important outstanding point in these talks--if the withdrawal

timetable were to be unreasonable, let us say, 15 months or a year or even less, 9 months--I don't know what the optimal number is, what the equitable number is, in terms of months. But supposing it were 15 months, we know, do we not, that the other important point already agreed to is that outside assistance to the Mujahideen, to the alliance, would cease on the first day the agreements began to operate. And in that scenario would the assistance immediately cut off to the Mujahideen, with, let us say, 15 months for the Soviets to withdraw, would that not pretty well guarantee a sell-out of the Afghan cause?

Dr. Ikle. It could severely weaken the cause of independence and freedom, and, of course, it could weaken the resistance fighters--it would be without outside support. And that is the very purpose of this proposal.

And, Senator, you have to keep in mind two things, not only that the withdrawal period may be too long, but also, judging from past agreements of this kind with communist governments, that the agreement will be violated on their side and we will adhere to the agreement for much longer, so that they may maybe stall in the withdrawal, fail to withdraw, attack the people in Afghanistan again, while the outside world would scrupulously adhere to the agreement for far too long if it is violated.

So we have to guard against both, an excessively long

withdrawal period and a potential for actual violation of the agreement on the part of the Soviet Union.

I think a reasonable withdrawal period, as I mentioned, would be the time it took the Soviet forces to invade the country. It's the same distance to go out.

Senator Humphrey. I want to go back to that in just a moment. I understand from the Secretary of State that the position of our government is that the timetable ought to be driven by logistical considerations only--and I want to come back to that in just a minute, if I may.

But again focusing on the withdrawal timetable, the government of Pakistan has publicly maintained that four months ought to be the maximum period of withdrawal. What are your views on that figure, four months?

Dr. Ikle. I would be concerned that that might be on the long side, and a shorter period is feasible, if the outside support for the people in Afghanistan is to seize the time that--we have done some analysis: even if the Soviets were to carefully pack up the equipment and take it out, which may be desirable, it wouldn't take longer than two weeks.

Senator Humphrey. So you would view four months as too long?

Dr. Ikle. I would fear it might be too long. I wouldn't be certain on that, because the resistance has shown

such resilience--they have lived through seven winters now, they might live through four months.

Senator Humphrey. I have heard that in these new talks between Moscow and Islamabad that Pakistan might be inclined to agree to a 15-month withdrawal period. What would be your reaction to that? I don't know if that's true.

Dr. Ikle. The longer the withdrawal period, the greater the opportunity not only for repressing the independence of the country during this period of withdrawal, and trying to permanently install a colonial regime, but also for cheating--we mustn't forget that second dimension.

Senator Humphrey. What do you suppose would be the reaction of our government, of the executive branch, to a timetable of something like 15 months? Would the executive view that as a breach of faith by the Pakistan government?

Dr. Ikle. I think Secretary Shultz, Secretary Weinberger, have already spoken and indicated a logistically driven withdrawal period is what is justified, and that could be much shorter.

Senator Humphrey. Let me for my part speculate that in the legislative branch, in the Congress, 15 months or 12 months or anything substantially more than 4 months would be viewed, I believe, as a sell-out, as a breach of faith, and would cause probably an erosion here in the Congress of support for Pakistan's program of economic and military



assistance. That erosion combined with the perennial concern over Pakistan's purported military-nuclear program could spell real trouble for the package which the President has requested.

Let us try to define what the logistical considerations are for a Soviet withdrawal. That now seems to be the position of our government that the timetable ought to be exclusively driven by logistical concerns. Can you elaborate on what those logistical concerns are, Dr. Ikle?

Dr. Ikle. Well, one thing that could take a little time is the removal of the equipment, and, as I said a minute ago, it's desirable probably that the equipment largely be removed for the occupation forces--it's not needed there. And the repair of equipment that cannot be moved and that is to be loaded, closing down the facilities, transfer of certain supplies which might under the agreement be given to the Afghan people or to the future Afghan government--these things obviously could take time. The movement of the Soviet forces--I wasn't just joking--it should take no longer than it took them to come in.

Senator Humphrey. So there could be no inclusion within logistical concerns, any political consideration, in your opinion?

Dr. Ikle. The attempt will be made--I think that's very clear--on the Soviet to have a very prolonged so-called

period of withdrawal during which they may or may not withdraw, but when the resistance then will be deprived of outside support--they want to starve the people, deprive them of their arms, and then, through various violations and possible delays, subjugate the people that they couldn't fight in seven years of warfare.

Senator Humphrey. Well, the withdrawal timetable is also important with respect to self-determination. We hear so much righteous talk about self-determination--the U.N. resolutions on Afghanistan refer to self-determination, the official policy of our government calls for self-determination--and yet there is no mechanism, indeed not even any discussion within the U.N.-mediated talks of a mechanism for self-determination. Lots of talk about self-determination, the need for it, the desire for it, the imperative of self-determination, and yet within these talks there is no mechanism for self-determination.

Therefore, the implied mechanism is that the Afghan people will take matters into their own hands. However, if the Soviets are there for 15 months or a year, or anything exceeding 4 months, and the alliance forces have no resupply, then that implied mechanism of self-determination would be very difficult indeed, would it not?

Dr. Ikle. Indeed. And we have to consider another possibility, that the Soviet government may count on having

the withdrawal agreement break down because of things they do. They will violate it as long as they get away with it, and then afterwards they will let it break down. And they figure, then, when the agreement is broken down, the mechanism, the spirit, the attitudes toward the outside support won't be the same as it was before; they will be irreparably weakened and will not be restored to the previous levels.

Senator Humphrey. I noted in my opening remarks that the legitimate representatives of the Afghan people have been excluded from either of these talks, the bilateral talks or the U.N.-mediated talks. Do you feel that it would be useful, Dr. Ikle, for talks to be encouraged, direct talks between the alliance forces and the Soviet Union?

Dr. Ikle. Clearly the alliance forces have to have a voice; they have fought for the self-determination of the country, and they will and must have a voice in arranging for that outcome. They also are better organized now, more unified than they used to be, so they can more easily speak as one organization. And that is of great advantage.

And so I would expect--and as I said in my opening remarks--a clear test of whether it's a genuine agreement for independence and self-determination is whether the refugees will return. That's one-third of the population. That third of the population will speak up together with the others in the country that are opposed to the Soviet occupation.

Senator Humphrey. What do you suppose would be the reaction of our government to any repatriation that had even the slightest element of force?

Dr. Ikle. I think it would be very, very negative, and I would hope the reporting by the media there would bring out that this is a forced repatriation. We have resisted that all along in other situations.

Senator Humphrey. You rightly commended the government of Pakistan for its courageous role in supporting the people of Afghanistan, both the refugees and the freedom fighters. In the face of increasing Soviet intimidation, the violations of Pakistan air space, as just one example, more than tripled in 1986, causing some sixty-six deaths and, as I recall, hundreds more have been killed in sabotage and terrorist incidents, no doubt inspired if not carried by the KGB and the KHAD. Pakistan has been subject to outright and crude verbal threats as well. I want to focus for a moment on that subject of intimidation.

The government of Pakistan has shown some interest--referring now to the airborne threat--shown some interest in securing airborne warning and control aircraft, AWACS aircraft. That has caused a good deal of concern in India, which is understandable, since those aircraft can be operated in more than one sector, obviously. If this intimidation were to cease, would there continue to be a need for AWACS

aircraft, in your opinion?

Dr. Ikle. Well, that would depend on the Soviet threat more generally and whether Afghanistan really returns to its independence, its status without a Soviet occupation force. But I think in a way the intimidation, the raids across the Pakistani border, across the Pakistani frontier, in some sense give the Pakistani government a foretaste of what would be in store for Pakistan should Afghanistan be incorporated into the Soviet Union, de facto if not de jure. And the self-interest of the Pakistani government is evident and is commensurate, of course, with its policy. That's the way it should be.

The security of Pakistan would be gravely threatened, and of all the other countries in the region, if the Soviet Union succeeded in turning Afghanistan into an extension of its empire and its military establishment, sort of like Mongolia or Uzbekistan.

Senator Humphrey. Mr. Secretary, there seem to be some signs that these direct talks between the Soviet Union and Pakistan are attempting to construct some mechanism of reconciliation. Should the Najib regime, or the communists in Afghanistan, have any part in a future government there?

Dr. Ikle. Well, the people who got co-opted or subordinated by the current colonialist regime in Kabul, I would think many of these could be reincorporated in the political

and normal social life of Afghanistan. I wouldn't be surprised if some of the leaders and top guys were seen in some apartments in Moscow rather than Kabul after the country became independent. It's very important to recognize that the puppet regime in Kabul doesn't gain the support of the people. Its armed forces aren't loyal, defection is a great risk. It makes it very difficult for the Afghan communist forces, or communist-controlled forces, to operate, to go out into the field and deploy in small units, because they defect. That forces the Soviet soldiers to become much more engaged in small combat and in risky operations scattered throughout the country. It drives up the casualties. And the decline of the role of the forces controlled from Kabul in a way is one of the major weakening factors of the Soviet presence there.

Then, of course, there is the long-term consideration that I mentioned, Senator, which is very important: the reaction of the Islamic world, of Moslem people, even in the Soviet Union, the risk of spillover into southern parts of the Soviet Union, so that the Soviet Union, if they persisted on its present course, might change what was really a friendly and totally non-threatening country across its border between the Soviet Union and Afghanistan into a very threatening situation a few years hence.

And that is the kind of calculation I think that Moscow

has to focus on.

Senator Humphrey. Let me finally examine the interdepartmental relations or functioning with regard to our Afghanistan effort. As you know, our government has offered to act as a guarantor of agreements that might come out of the U.N. talks. Let me first ask, was the Department of Defense consulted in advance of that commitment to act as a guarantor?

Dr. Ikle. Yes, we have a good coordination on this issue with all the involved agencies--the State Department, NSC, CIA. We have frequent meetings at various levels, working levels, at senior level, to review the situation.

Senator Humphrey. And is the Department of Defense being consulted about these latest developments, about what positions the United States should take about the latest developments in each of these talks?

Dr. Ikle. Yes, we are, Senator. I know the city thrives on differences within the executive branch in Washington, and the media love to report on that--and maybe that's the reason we don't have enough reporting on Afghanistan. If there are any, they are very minor and passing differences, although, of course, there are very few if any differences between the views of Congress and the executive branch.

Senator Humphrey. Well, thank you very much, Dr. Ikle.

Dr. Ikle. Thank you, Senator, for the opportunity to appear before you.

Senator Humphrey. You are welcome. And your appearance has been very helpful. Thank you.



STATEMENT OF ESHAN-JAN AREEF, WASHINGTON  
REPRESENTATIVE, JAMIAT-I-ISLAMI.

Senator Humphrey. Our next witness is Eshan-Jan Areef, who is the Washington representative of Jamiat-I-Islami.

Mr. Areef, good morning.

Mr. Areef. Dear Chairman, before testifying on Soviet political tricks and maneuvers, I would like to present to you a short introduction on Soviet atrocities that they have used so far in Afghanistan.

The Soviet-directed military invasion which took place on December 27, 1979, is one of the most tragic events of the 20th century. The Soviet goal of world domination has not changed since its inception in 1917. Afghanistan is one step closer to the Persian Gulf, the site of most of the world's resources. It is considered a military laboratory, a place where the Soviets test out their state-of-the-art weapons, helicopters, Mig fighters, chemical weapons, and napalm.

Political tricks and maneuvers. Soviets, who have been unable to suppress and crush the resistance by way of military power, started seeking some other ways that could help them in implementing their expansionist policy and easily conquer Afghanistan. The best way for them was political tricks and maneuvers in which they had experience. Following are some of their cunning tricks and maneuvers that they have

used so far.

I. Changing the puppet leadership. When the Soviets realize that a servant is no longer useful, they kill or replace him with a better servant. They killed Taraki through Amin, then Amin was killed and Babrak was brought directly from Moscow. Later he was replaced by Najib. In all these changes we see every puppet has been worse than his predecessor. Through these jugglings, Soviets have always tried to put the responsibility of all criminal acts on the puppet who has been replaced and have tried to wash out themselves as innocent and uninvolved in the events.

The latest puppet, Najib, was installed as the General Secretary of the so-called People's Democratic Party of Afghanistan in May 1986. From the outset, Najib has tried to put a new face by claiming to respect Islam, to respect Afghan traditions and values, to adhere to democratic ideals, to make an effort to form a government of national reconciliation, to pardon the political prisoners, etcetera. But Najib's background and past activities belie his claims. He is a staunch atheist communist and much more ruthless than his predecessors. Before his new position, he was the head of the dreadful KHAD which is responsible for the death and torture of tens of thousand of innocent people. As a foreign analyst puts it, "Najib clearly earned his promotion on the basis of his dynamism, experience in dealing with the tribes

and nationalities, and military and security experience rather than the likelihood that he would make the regime more acceptable to the people of Afghanistan--though national reconciliation has become one of his favorite slogans."

II. Withdrawal of six regiments of the Russian troops. The withdrawal of six regiments in October of last year which was accompanied with a great deal of publicity was clearly another ruse. It is quite obvious that even if the withdrawal were genuine, the removal of a small fraction of the Soviet forces would not bring any major change in its military might in Afghanistan. As it happened, however, the withdrawal was only a propaganda ploy without any military effects. Three out of the six withdrawn regiments were air defense units which did not play any military role in the fight against the Mujahideen, who lack an air force. The other three regiments were even before it. Thus the withdrawal seems to have been part of a general routine troop rotation.

The big fuss made about the troop withdrawal seems to have aimed at the following:

1. To pretend to the world that the Soviet puppet regime has gained stability and can stand on its own feet. On October 14, Najib claimed that the withdrawal testified to the increasing capabilities of the regime's forces!
2. To use the withdrawal as an evidence of

1 Russia's willingness for political settlement and for the  
2 ultimate complete withdrawal of its forces.

3 3. To impress world opinion and to exert pressure  
4 on Pakistan in its indirect talks with the puppet regime.  
5 (The news of the withdrawal was announced before a round of  
6 the U.N.-sponsored talks on Afghanistan.)

7 4. To influence the discussion of the Afghanistan  
8 issue at the U.N. General Assembly, to weaken its resolution,  
9 and to decrease the votes condemning Soviet aggression. (The  
10 October withdrawal fanfare preceded the U.N. General Assemb-  
11 ly's discussions.)

12 III. Cease-fire and national reconciliation. This  
13 proposal is a plot to change the true nature of war in Af-  
14 ghanistan and show as if it is a civil war. As long as  
15 Soviet troops are inside Afghanistan and puppet government is  
16 in power the idea of cease-fire is meaningless. To the  
17 Mujahideen it will be a shameful compromise and it is like  
18 surrendering to the enemy.

19 The idea of joining in a coalition government in which  
20 the communist elements and murderers are involved is quite  
21 unrealistic. In the formation of such a government, Soviets  
22 want to stabilize their puppet regime which is totally unac-  
23 ceptable to the Afghan people. It is quite clear that the  
24 proposed cease-fire through the puppet regime is no more than  
25 a propaganda ploy.

1 It is a clever game by which the Soviets want to make  
2 the world believe that they are peace-loving and the Mujahi-  
3 deen are warmongers. If the Mujahideen were to accept the  
4 puppet government's proposal, they will in fact legitimize  
5 Soviet domination in Afghanistan. If they reject the propo-  
6 sal, as they have done, they would play into the hands of  
7 Soviet propaganda and be branded as warmongers.

8 The time they have chosen for this propaganda campaign  
9 is of vital importance to the Soviet leadership. It is just  
10 before the Islamic summit in Kuwait. The campaign is direc-  
11 ted to minimize the pressure on the Soviets in that confer-  
12 ence. Mujahideen had decided to raise the question of the  
13 recognition of the resistance by OIC. This is not very  
14 pleasant for the Soviets. They want to do everything to  
15 prevent Mujahideen from gaining such a victory. Geneva talks  
16 will be opened on February 25. Soviets wanted to send their  
17 puppets to attend the talks with a new propaganda tool. The  
18 real intention of Soviets will surface when the timetable for  
19 the withdrawal of their forces will be discussed. From the  
20 situation inside the country, it seems that they cannot agree  
21 on total withdrawal in a reasonable time period.

22 Putting pressure on the Pakistan government from within  
23 is another purpose of the present propaganda offensive. Some  
24 leftist opposition groups and their papers are trying to say  
25 that everything in Afghanistan has become normal and refugees

can return.

It is quite clear that the Soviets are not honest and sincere in their claims for peace and political settlement in Afghanistan. If they were, why shouldn't they themselves announce the cease-fire rather than their puppets who have neither any military force nor any authority? If the Soviets were sincere, why don't they just withdraw their troops and take their agents along with them and let the Afghan people decide for themselves?

Historical facts show that the Soviets have seldom honored their agreements. They also show that the Soviets have used "coalition government" or pro-Russian "national governments" to subjugate other nations. How did they bring Central Asia under their domination? How could they turn eastern Europe and Mongolia into their satellites? Now that the Soviets have failed to subjugate the Afghan Mujahid nation by military force, they want to use their new trick to cool off the liberation war and to isolate the Mujahideen domestically and at the international scene. But they should know that the Afghan people have seen through their plot. We believe soon the Soviets will face an even worse defeat and more disgrace in their political cunning hoax and deceitful maneuvers than their military defeat.

It should also be emphasized that the Mujahideen are eager to see an end to the conflict in Afghanistan. The

sufferings of the Afghan people in the past 9 years are unbelievable. But peace can be established only by the removal of the cause of the conflict. The cause of the conflict was the imposition of a puppet regime through military intervention of the Soviet Union. How could there be peace while the Soviet puppets and the Red Army are still in Afghanistan?

IV. U.N.-sponsored talks at Geneva. The U.N.-sponsored talks at Geneva have been going on since 1982. The two parties involved in these talks are the Pakistani government and the puppet regime in Kabul. No fruitful results have come out of these talks yet. The Soviets have used these fake talks to defuse international criticisms of their invasion in Afghanistan and to pacify the resistance inside by diverting the Mujahideen's attention from armed struggle and giving them false hopes for a political settlement. The Soviets also want to discourage international support to the Afghan resistance and gain some sort of recognition for their puppet regime. Moreover, they want to show themselves peace-loving, pretending that they do not want to impose their will and their system on the people of Afghanistan by force.

Pakistan, who has taken part in the talks, has no confidence and assurance of the Soviets' sincerity and intentions. This is a game that the Soviets could win. Pakistan's participation in the talks seems to be for two rea-

sons.

1. Peaceful return of 3 million Afghan refugees residing in her soil near the Afghan border.

2. To secure its territory from the Red Army's direct threat by ending the war in Afghanistan.

Moreover, it seems that the Soviets threaten Pakistan by its military force to make it take part in the Geneva negotiations and to be flexible there. The past rounds of talks have always coincided with increased Soviet military activities at the Pakistani border.

The same is true this time. According to recent news reports, only ten days before the new round of talks, Russian planes bombarded a Pakistani border town, killing one soldier and wounding eight people.

In these negotiations the subjects of discussion have been the following:

1. Withdrawal of foreign troops.
2. Return of the refugees.
3. End of foreign interference.
4. International guarantees for non-interference.

First of all, some items of the discussion are objectionable. The items have been stated in such a way as if the Soviets were innocent and unrelated to the present situation. For example, the international guarantee for non-interference is completely absurd and meaningless. No country invaded



Afghanistan except the Soviets and the only foreign troops present in that country are the Red Army. With the withdrawal of Soviet troops war in Afghanistan will be over and the outside interference will be ended. By asking for international guarantees, the negotiations give credibility to Soviet allegations that Pakistan and the U.S. interfered in Afghanistan domestic affairs.

The Afghan people do not believe that these talks would lead to a just solution of the Afghan conflict because of the following reasons:

1. The two parties involved in the conflict are not present in the talks (the Soviets who are the invaders and the Mujahideen who have waged the struggle for the past 8 years). Pakistan is a host country for 3 million refugees and the puppet regime which has no authority at all are not the real side of the issue.

2. The right of self-determination which is the heart of the matter is not a subject of discussion and has been dropped from the agenda.

No country has the right to decide on the future of Afghan people or to act as a guardian or guarantor on behalf of the Afghan people. Afghans and only Afghans have the right to decide on their future and choose the form of government they want. A nation who has fought for more than 7 years against a brutal army of occupation has also the

ability to make its own decision on the affairs related to itself. It must be stated that no stable government will come to power without the participation of the Mujahideen. The Mujahideen are not ready to lay down their arms unless their aims are met.

We are not denying the importance of a political settlement and do not ignore the usefulness of sincere efforts do not bring a just solution to the conflict. It benefits no one but the invaders.

The Afghan Mujahid nation pays no attention to such fake talks and carries on its armed struggle until the complete withdrawal of Soviet forces and the elimination of the communist puppet regime in their country.

[Statement follows:]

CEASE-FIRE, RECONCILIATION  
AND  
THE U.N. PROXIMITY TALKS  
AS  
EXAMPLES  
OF  
SOVIET POLITICAL TRICKS AND MANEOUVRES

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TESTIMONY BEFORE THE  
CONGRESSIONAL TASK FORCE ON AFGHANISTAN

BY

ESHAN JAN AREEF  
RESIDENT REPRESENTATIVE  
OF  
JAMIAT-E-ISLAMI AFGHANISTAN  
IN  
WASHINGTON D.C.

FEBRUARY 17, 1987

IN THE NAME OF ALLAH, THE BENEFICENT, THE MERCIFUL

Dear Chairman and Respected Audiences:

Before testifying on Soviets Political trick and manoeuvres I would like to present to you a short introduction on Soviets' atrocities that they have used so far in Afghanistan.

16 Soviet-direct military invasion which took place on December 27, 1979 is one of the most tragic events of the 20th century. The Soviet goal of world domination has not changed since its inception in 1917. Afghanistan is one step closer to the Persian Gulf--the site of most of the world resources. It is considered a military laboratory, a place where the Soviets test out their state-of-the-art weapons, helicopters, Mig fighters, chemical weapons and napalm.

But to subdue Afghanistan was not an easy task for the Red Army. The Soviets thought they would take over Afghanistan in a week or two. Their dreams did not come true. The Afghan people started to resist against them. In order to destroy the resistance in its early stages, they tried to bring separation between those who are actively involved in the armed struggle and those who don't have the arms to fight or are unable to do the fighting by giving money, food, shelter, clothes, positions and many other promises. But the Soviets failed in their efforts and the people's support for the Mujahideen increased and the resistance gradually got stronger. When the enemy saw the growing opposition of the Afghan people against themselves, they used force to crush the resistance.

The Soviets started looting houses, killing, torturing and imprisoning defenseless people. Through continuous offensives and aerial bombardments, they killed thousands of innocent civilians, men, women and children. Thousands of others have been burned, crushed under tanks and buried alive. In retaliation for one of their soldiers they would destroy the whole village and kill every living person as well as livestock. As a result of these brutalities, over a million of people were martyred, one third of the population were driven to neighboring countries and elsewhere forming the largest refugee population in the world. more than two million took refuge in liberated areas under the control of Mujahideen. Soviet troops destroyed residential houses as well as religious schools and holy places.

Through indiscriminate aerial bombardments and massive ground attacks many towns and villages either were leveled or destroyed. Soviets burned harvests, destroyed the fields by tanks and bulldozers. They even destroyed the irrigation system and eliminated the civilians means of livelihood. These were done in an effort to starve the Mujahideen into submission. These are only some of thousands of Red Army's heinous crimes and genocide in Afghanistan.

heinous

## Political Tricks and Maneuvres

Soviets who have been unable to suppress and crush the resistance by way of military power, started seeking some other ways that could help them in implementing their expansionist policy and easily conquer Afghanistan. The best way for them was political tricks and maneuvres in which they had experience. Following are some of their cunning tricks and maneuvres that they have used so far:

### I. Changing the puppet leadership:

When the Soviets realize that a servant is no longer useful, they kill or replace him with a better servant. They killed Taraki through Amin. Then Amin was killed and Babrak was brought directly from Moscow. Later he was replaced by Najib. In all these changes we see every puppet has been worse than his predecessor. Through these jugglings Soviets have always tried to put the responsibility of all criminal acts on the puppet who has been replaced and have tried to wash out themselves as innocent and uninvolved in the events.

The latest puppet, Najib, was installed as the "General Secretary" of the so called "People's Democratic Party of Afghanistan" in May 1986. From the outset, Najib has tried to put a new face by claiming to respect Islam, to respect Afghan traditions and values, to adhere to democratic ideals, to make an effort to form a government of national reconciliation, to pardon the political prisoners, ... etc. But Najib's background and past activities belie his claims. He is a staunch atheist communist and much more ruthless than his predecessors. Before his new position, he was the head of the dreadful KHAD which is responsible for the death and torture of tens of thousands of innocent people. As a foreign analyst puts it, "Najib clearly earned his promotion on the basis of his dynamism, experience in dealing with the tribes and nationalities, and military and security experience rather than the likelihood that he would make the regime more acceptable to the people of Afghanistan--though national reconciliation has become one of his favorite slogans."

### II. Withdrawal of six regiments of the Russian troops:

The withdrawal of six regiments in October of last year which was accompanied with a great deal of publicity was clearly another "ruse." It is quite obvious that even if the withdrawal were genuine, the removal of a small fraction of the Soviet forces would not bring any major change in its military might in Afghanistan. As it happened, however, the Withdrawal was only a propaganda ploy without any military effects. Three out of the six withdrawn regiments were air defence units which did not play any military role in the fight against the Mujahideen who lack an air force. The other three regiments were even before it. Thus, the withdrawal seems to have been part of a general routine troop rotation.

The big fuss made about the troop withdrawal seems to have aimed at the following:

1. To pretend to the world that the Soviet puppet regime has gained stability and can stand on its own feet. On October 14, Najib claimed that the withdrawal testified to the increasing capabilities of the regime's forces!
2. To use the withdrawal as an "evidence" of Russia's willingness for political settlement and for the ultimate complete withdrawal of its forces.
3. To impress the world opinion and to exert pressure on Pakistan in its indirect talks with the puppet regime (the news of the withdrawal was announced before a round of the UN-sponsored talks on Afghanistan).
4. To influence the discussion of the Afghanistan issue at the UN General Assembly, to weaken its resolution, and to decrease the votes condemning Soviet aggression (the October withdrawal fanfare preceded the UN General Assembly's discussions).

### III. Cease-fire and National Reconciliation:

This proposal is a plot to change the true nature of war in Afghanistan and show as if it is a civil war. As long as Soviet troops are inside Afghanistan and puppet government is in power the idea of cease-fire is meaningless. To the Mujahideen it will be a shameful compromise and it is like surrendering to the enemy.

The idea of joining in a coalition government in which the communist elements and murderers are involved is quite unrealistic. In the formation of such a government, Soviets want to stabilize their puppet regime which is totally unacceptable to the Afghan people. It is quite clear that the proposed cease-fire through the puppet regime is no more than a propaganda ploy.

It is a clever game by which the Soviets want to make the world believe that they are peace-loving and the Mujahideen are war mongers. If the Mujahideen were to accept the puppet government's proposal, they will in fact legitimize Soviet domination on Afghanistan. If they reject the proposal--as they have done-- they would play in the hands of Soviet propaganda and be branded as war mongers.

The time they have chosen for this propaganda campaign is of vital importance to the Soviet leadership. It is just before the Islamic summit in Kuwait. The campaign is directed to minimize the pressure on the Soviets in that conference. Mujahideen had decided to raise the question of the recognition of the resistance by OIC. This is not very pleasant for the Soviets. They want to do every thing to prevent Mujahideen from gaining such a victory. Geneva talks will be opened on Feb. 25th. Soviets wanted to send their puppets to attend the talks with a new propaganda tool. The real intention of Soviets will surface when the timetable for the withdrawal of their forces will be discussed. From the situation inside the country, it seems that they can not agree on total withdrawal in a reasonable time period.

Putting pressure on the Pakistan government from within is another purpose of the present propaganda offensive. Some leftist opposition groups and their papers are trying to say that everything in Afghanistan has become normal and refugees can return.

It is quite clear that the Soviets are not honest and sincere in their claims for peace and political settlement in Afghanistan. If they were, why shouldn't they themselves announce the cease-fire rather than their puppets who have neither any military force nor any authority? If the Soviets were sincere, why don't they just withdraw their troops and take their agents along with them and let the Afghan people decide for themselves?

Historical facts show that the Soviets have seldom honored their agreements. They also show that the Soviets have used "coalition government" or pro-Russian "national governments" to subjugate other nations. How did they bring the Central Asia under their domination? How could they turn the Eastern Europe and Mongolia into their satellites? Now that the Soviets have failed to subjugate the Afghan Mujahid nation by military force, they want to use their new trick to cool off the liberation war and to isolate the Mujahideen domestically and at the international scene. But they should know that the Afghan people have seen through their plot. We believe soon the Soviets will face an even worse defeat and more disgrace in their political cunning hoax and deceitful manoeuvres than their military defeat.

It should also be emphasized that the Mujahideen are eager to see and end to the conflict in Afghanistan. The sufferings of the Afghan people in the past nine years are unbelievable. But peace can be established only by the removal of the cause of the conflict. The cause of the conflict was the imposition of a puppet regime through military intervention of the Soviet Union. How could there be peace while the Soviet puppets and the Red Army are still in Afghanistan?

#### IV. UN-Sponsored talks at Geneva:

The UN-Sponsored talks at Geneva have going on since 1982. The two parties involved in these talks are Pakistani government and the puppet regime in Kabul. No fruitful results have come out from these talks yet. The Soviets have used these fake talks to defuse international criticisms of their invasion in Afghanistan and to pacify the resistance inside by diverting the Mujahideen attention from armed struggle and giving them false hopes for political settlement. Soviets also want to discourage international support to the Afghan resistance and gain some sort of recognition for their puppet regime. Moreover they want to show themselves peaceloving, pretending that they do not want to impose their will and their system on the people of Afghanistan by force.

Pakistan who has taken part in the talks has no confidence and assurance of Soviets sincerity and intentions. This is a game that the Soviets could win. Pakistan's participation in the talks seems to be for two reasons.

1. Peaceful return of 3 million Afghan refugees residing in her soil near the Afghan border.
2. To secure its territory from the Red Army's direct threat by ending the war in Afghanistan.

Moreover, it seems that Soviet threatens Pakistan by its military force to make it take part in the Geneva negotiations and to be flexible there. The past rounds of talks have always coincided with increased Soviet military activities at the Pakistani border.

The same is true this time. According to recent news report, only ten days before the new rounds of talks, Russian planes bombarded a Pakistani border town killing one soldiers and wounding eight people.

In these negotiations the subject of discussion have been the following :

1. Withdrawal of foreign troops
2. Return of the refugees
3. End of foreign interference
4. International gauranttees for non-interference

First of all some items of the discussion are objectionable. The items have been stated in such a way as if the Soviets were innocent and unrelated to the present situation. For example: the international gaurantee for non-interference is completely absurd and meaningless. No country invaded Afghanistan except the Soviets and the only foreign troops present in that country are the Red Army. With the withdrawal of Soviet troops war in Afgahnistan will be over and the outside interference will be ended. By asking for international gauranttee, the negotiations give credibility to Soviet allegations that Pakistan and the US interfered in Afghanistan domestic affairs.

The Afghan people do not believe that these talks would lead to a just solution of the Afghan conflict because of the following reasons:

1. The two parties involved in the conflict are not present in the talks ( the Soviets who are the invaders and the Mujahideen who have waged the struggle for the past 8 years). Pakistan is a host country for 3 million refugees and the puppet regime which has no authority at all are not the real side of the issue.
2. The right of self-determination which is the heart of the matter is not a subject of discussion and has been dropped from the Agenda.

No country has the right to decide on the future of Afghan people or to act as a gaurdian or gaurantor on behafe of the Afghan people. Afghans and only Afghans have the right to decide on their future and choose the form of government they want. A nation who has fought for more than seven years against a brutal army of occupation, has also the ability to make its own decision on the affairs related to itself. It must be stated that no stable government will come to power without the participation of the Mujahideen. The Mujahideen are not ready to lay down their arms unless their aims are met.

We are not denying the importance of a political settlement and do not ignore the usefulness of sincere efforts towards the matter. But as stated above, the present talks do not bring a just solution to the conflict. It benefits no one but the invaders.

The Afghan Mujahid Nation pays no attention to such fake talks and <sup>carry</sup> ~~carry~~ on its armed struggle until the complete withdrawal of Soviet forces and the elimination of Communist puppet regime in their country.



1 Senator Humphrey. Thank you, Mr. Areef, for your excel-  
2 lent statement. You reject, then, all the current diplomatic  
3 initiatives on the part of the Soviet Union and its puppet in  
4 Kabul as insincere, is that correct?

5 Mr. Areef. Sure.

6 Senator Humphrey. Are you empowered to speak for the  
7 alliance here today, or only for Jamiat?

8 Mr. Areef. I am a representative of Jamiat, but the  
9 whole presentation that I made is completely in line with the  
10 policy of the alliance.

11 Senator Humphrey. Then I will ask your opinion in your  
12 capacity of representative of Jamiat. Does the alliance  
13 desire direct negotiations with Moscow?

14 Mr. Areef. Yes, this is just in case of the withdrawal  
15 of their forces, the alliance is given to talks with the  
16 Soviets in case of withdrawing their forces. Yes, this is  
17 what they stated in their latest proclamation in Geneva.

18 Senator Humphrey. The proclamation stated a desire or a  
19 proposal for direct negotiations with Moscow?

20 Mr. Areef. Not a proposal, just in case that the So-  
21 viets really want to withdraw their forces, there might be  
22 talks and negotiations between the Afghan Mujahideen, the  
23 unity, and the Soviets.

24 Senator Humphrey. How do the Mujahideen feel about  
25 their exclusion from the talks mediated by the United

1 Nations?

2 Mr. Areef. Actually, the Mujahideen do not believe in  
3 the outcome of these talks, and this is as I stated in my  
4 testimony that these talks cannot lead to a peaceful solution  
5 and to solve the conflict in Afghanistan. And the Mujahideen  
6 are not optimistic about the result of this, because the two  
7 sides of the issue, which is the Mujahideen on one side and  
8 the Soviets on the other side, are not present in these  
9 negotiations.

10 Senator Humphrey. So you regard the U.N. talks as  
11 illegitimate?

12 Mr. Areef. That is what we actually appreciate, any  
13 sincere efforts, whether that be from the United Nations or  
14 any other international forums. But under this condition  
15 that we see the talks in Geneva, we are not actually support-  
16 ing or optimistic about these talks.

17 Senator Humphrey. You do not support them because you  
18 are excluded?

19 Mr. Areef. Yes, right.

20 Senator Humphrey. If you were included, would you sup-  
21 port them?

22 Mr. Areef. This depends on the unity, whether the unity  
23 accepts, you know, in the future conditions; if the talks are  
24 between the Soviets and the Mujahideen and the unity, then  
25 that will be acceptable to them.

Senator Humphrey. In your opinion, the talks will be legitimate if the alliance were an official party to those talks.

Mr. Areef. Yes; it seems, yes.

Senator Humphrey. Are the Mujahideen leaders being consulted by any of the parties as these talks go on?

Mr. Areef. They do what they want, and the Mujahideen, who have been excluded from the talks, this is completely changing the nature of the war in Afghanistan. And this obviously is unacceptable to the Afghan Mujahideen, to the unity, who are the legitimate representatives of the Afghan people. And what the Soviets and the puppet government in Afghanistan do, actually this is completely unacceptable to the people of Afghanistan.

Senator Humphrey. Are you worried about a sell-out in these negotiations?

Mr. Areef. Sure, yes.

Senator Humphrey. How could you see a sell-out coming about? I mean, what sort of conditions would you regard as a sell-out, what sort of an agreement?

Mr. Areef. First of all, the condition of international guarantees. If any country offer a guarantee, it is completely the Soviets' claims will be proved that there was other outside interference in Afghanistan. So it will give the Soviets credibility for their claims that they have been

making in the past many, many times. And there is no need for an international guarantee, because the Afghans--there is no outside interference in Afghanistan except Soviet interference in that country. Once they withdraw their forces, everything will be over in Afghanistan. There will be no war.

And I think through these negotiations and the terms under discussion in Geneva, actually the Soviets want to gain some kind of recognition for the puppet regime and give legitimacy to the puppet regime in Kabul. The Soviets will not withdraw their forces until they are sure that after they leave the Afghanistan, the remaining of their puppet regime will be guaranteed in that country.

Senator Humphrey. What do you regard as a reasonable withdrawal timetable for the Soviet forces?

Mr. Areef. You know that the Soviets brought their large forces into Afghanistan in less than one week, and it will not take more longer time--you know, the maximum time that they need to withdraw their forces is one month. And there is no need for six months or one year, if they really want to withdraw their forces from the country.

But we actually--the Afghan people are not only fighting to withdraw the Soviet forces from Afghanistan, but they are fighting against the communist regime also. And when the Soviets really want to withdraw their forces, they must

1 withdraw their forces and also take back their communist  
2 regime, the guests that they brought into our country take  
with them.

Senator Humphrey. Do you regard the four-month standard  
which the government of Pakistan has proposed as reasonable,  
a maximum of four months?

Mr. Areef. I'm not actually the four months or three  
months or one month. They can withdraw their forces in a  
very short time if they want, and this is the talks between  
the Pakistani government and the puppet regime--and about the  
terms of the withdrawal I cannot say anything because it  
depends on the alliance, because there are no indications  
actually--they reject completely these negotiations and they  
are not sure about the outcome of them.

Senator Humphrey. How would the people of Afghanistan  
feel towards Pakistan if Pakistan agreed to, let's say, a  
one-year withdrawal? Would the people of Afghanistan feel  
betrayed by Pakistan?

Mr. Areef. This is completely, as I told you--this  
should be done, and any agreement that is related to the  
future of Afghanistan and to the withdrawal of Soviet forces,  
that must be done between the Islamic unity, Afghan Mujahi-  
deen, and the Soviet Union, and not the Pakistani government  
or any other government.

Senator Humphrey. Are you at all concerned about a

forced repatriation or a repatriation that involves any degree of force?

Mr. Areef. Yes, that's right. They all the time try to intimidate Pakistan to be flexible in the talks and to accept the Soviet condition in the talks. But as far as Pakistani government, the pressure on the Pakistani government from the refugees, they are optimistic about it. But they are not sure about the aims and intentions of the Soviets.

Senator Humphrey. Would the refugees in Pakistan, the Afghan refugees, would they return to Afghanistan if there were a so-called government of reconciliation that included communists?

Mr. Areef. There is no way that the people of Afghanistan, who fought for seven years--they fought for the establishment of an Islamic government. And there is no way that the people of a country who have fought for seven years and give one million sacrifice in this war just for the establishment of an Islamic government in Afghanistan--there is no way that the communists and Islam make one government that would be acceptable to the Muslim, and communism and Islam are not compatible, they cannot come together. And there is no way for communist elements to be in a government that is a so-called coalition government.

Senator Humphrey. Supposing Moscow and Islamabad reached some kind of agreement that involves a government of

reconciliation, that included communists, what would happen?

Mr. Areef. You said the Islamic government? As I told you, this depends on the people of Afghanistan to decide about their future government. And it has nothing to do with Islamic governments that they impose a coalition government, that communists take part in that government. And in my opinion the people of Afghanistan will never accept such a government, because it is completely against the principles of Islam.

Senator Humphrey. Well, you are saying, then, that if such an agreement were reached between Moscow and Islamabad, the people of Afghanistan would reject it just as they have rejected the so-called cease-fire and the so-called offer of reconciliation by Najib.

Mr. Areef. Yes.

Senator Humphrey. Can you tell us what the latest developments are in the proposal by the alliance to form a provisional government as announced in its statement of January 166th?

Mr. Areef. Yes. A commission was set up to work on a provisional government, to draft a procedure for a provisional government, and the work has started since the 1st of January. In one month this will be completed, and will be submitted to the council of the Islamic committee of Afghanistan Mujahideen, supreme council. And then this provisional

government will be formed. And what does the provisional government do under the supervision of this government that takes actually the administration and control of the affairs, the jirga, the Islamic parliament--and also the government will be formed through election.

And once the parliament is established, then the constitution will be made, will be drafted and approved by this jirga.

Senator Humphrey. And how long will that entire process take?

Mr. Areef. I cannot actually predict on that, how long, but it will not take a long time.

Senator Humphrey. You say that a parliament will be elected?

Mr. Areef. The representatives, congressmen and also senators--these will be elected, and this jirga, which is the Islamic parliament, has authority to make the constitution.

Senator Humphrey. Is there some date set for that election?

Mr. Areef. No.

Senator Humphrey. Very well, thank you, Mr. Areef, for your testimony. It's been very helpful.



Senator Humphrey. Ambassador Charles Lichenstein is our next witness. He is the former U.S. Deputy Representative to the United Nations. Mr. Ambassador, thank you for coming.

STATEMENT OF AMBASSADOR CHARLES LICHENSTEIN  
FORMER U.S. DEPUTY REPRESENTATIVE TO THE  
UNITED NATIONS

Ambassador Lichenstein. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman. It's a privilege to be invited to be here today. It's a privilege to be part of the same group that includes Mr. Areef and Under Secretary Ikle and Professor Pipes. The distinguished company on both sides of the table is a matter of great encouragement to me, as it must be to the people of Afghanistan.

I think, Mr. Chairman, that this Task Force is performing an absolutely essential service to the American people and to anyone in the Free World who cares to listen, and ultimately to the cause of freedom. I don't simply mean this as the usual Capitol Hill gruff; I mean it in the most literal sense, because I believe that the greatest danger that we all must contend with -- and it seems to me to have been implicit as an undercurrent in all of the testimony so far -- is that we, not the people of Afghanistan, but that we will lose our will and our determination, and that we will be tempted to take some easy way out, and that as so often before we will deliver to the Soviets across the bargaining table what they have not gained and probably cannot gain on the ground.

Senator Humphrey. Mr. Ambassador, while you're pausing there, let me state a caveat here.

If the Majority Leader should arrive -- and he is expected momentarily -- I will have to ask you to defer on your testimony for just a moment. You know how that works.

Ambassador Lichenstein. I will suspend instantly.

Senator Humphrey. Fine, thank you. Please continue.

Ambassador Lichenstein. I will even make a special tribute to the fact that both sides of the aisle are represented on both sides of the table, Mr. Chairman.

Senator Humphrey. Yes. Well, it is more than coincidental. There is broad bipartisan support in the Congress for the Afghan cause.

Ambassador Lichenstein. It has always been a great mark of this Task Force.

The President, as you know, Mr. Chairman, has often said that various problems that we must contend with in the world are simple, but they are not easy. I think that this is an excellent example of such a problem.

It is very simple to state the objectives. It is not easy to get from here to there. No one, in fact, it seems to me, has stated better what the objectives must be of the United States and the Free World in Afghanistan than you, yourself, and your distinguished colleague, Representative Jack Kemp, in your letter of January 12th of this year to

STATEMENT OF  
ROBERT C. BYRD  
SENATE MAJORITY LEADER  
BEFORE THE  
CONGRESSIONAL TASK FORCE ON AFGHANISTAN  
TUESDAY, FEBRUARY 17, 1987

MR. CHAIRMAN AND MEMBERS OF THE COMMITTEE, I AM PLEASED TO PARTICIPATE IN THESE HEARINGS BEFORE THE CONGRESSIONAL TASK FORCE ON AFGHANISTAN. I COMMEND THE TASK FORCE FOR ITS CONTINUING EFFORT TO BRING TO LIGHT THE SUFFERING OF THE AFGHAN PEOPLE, AND TO REMIND THE WORLD OF OUR OBLIGATIONS TO THIS FREEDOM LOVING PEOPLE. WHEN OTHERS GROW WEARY OF THE CAUSE AND BEGIN TO FORGET, IT IS THIS KIND OF DEDICATION UNDER SUCH FINE LEADERSHIP AS THE DISTINGUISHED SENATOR FROM NEW HAMPSHIRE, MR. HUMPHREY, THAT REMINDS FREEDOM LOVING PEOPLE EVERYWHERE THAT AN ENTIRE NATION STRUGGLES TO REGAIN ITS SOVEREIGN RIGHT TO SELF-DETERMINATION.

MR. GORBACHEV HAS BEEN VERY BUSY OVER THE LAST FEW DAYS STAGING A GREAT PEACE OFFENSIVE IN MOSCOW. THIS PAST WEEKEND THE SOVIET LEADERSHIP ORGANIZED A MAJOR INTERNATIONAL CONFERENCE, CALLED A FORUM FOR A "NUCLEAR-FREE WORLD AND THE SURVIVAL OF MANKIND." THE IMPLICATION IS OF A

NEW SOVIET OPENNESS, REASONABLENESS, ENLIGHTENED BEHAVIOR,  
AND CONCILIATION WITHIN SOVIET SOCIETY. THE IDEA OF A PEACE  
OFFENSIVE CANNOT BE CRITICIZED, BUT IF THE MESSAGE IS RIGHT,  
THE ADDRESS IS WRONG. THE TEST OF MR. GORBACHEV'S  
COMMITMENT TO PEACE, THE TEST OF HIS " POLITICAL WILL", A  
FAVORITE PHRASE OF HIS, IS PRACTICAL RESULTS -- PRACTICAL  
RESULTS NOT IN MOSCOW, BUT IN KABUL AND THE COUNTRYSIDE OF  
AFGHANISTAN.

AFTER SEVEN YEARS OF SOVIET OCCUPATION, AN ESTIMATED  
118,000 SOVIET TROOPS ARE WITHIN THE BOUNDARIES OF  
AFGHANISTAN; NEARLY ONE-THIRD OF THE AFGHAN POPULATION HAS  
BEEN FORCED TO FLEE THEIR HOMELAND TO REFUGEE CAMPS IN  
PAKISTAN AND IRAN; AND WE RECEIVE REPORTS OF THE MOST CRUEL  
METHODS OF WARFARE WAGED AGAINST THE AFGHAN PEOPLE.  
HOWEVER, AFGHAN RESISTANCE TO SOVIET CONTROL PERSISTS AND  
IS, IN FACT, MORE EFFECTIVE NOW THAN EVER BEFORE.

SOME OF THE MOST UNSETTLING REPORTS COMING OUT OF

AFGHANISTAN ARE THOSE DESCRIBING THE HUMAN RIGHTS VIOLATIONS BEING COMMITTED BY THE SOVIETS. IN HIS NOVEMBER 5, 1985 REPORT, THE SPECIAL RAPPORTEUR OF THE UNITED NATIONS COMMISSION ON HUMAN RIGHTS DESCRIBED THE SITUATION AS SUCH:

"THE GOVERNMENT, WITH HEAVY SUPPORT FROM FOREIGN TROOPS, ACTS WITH GREAT SEVERITY AGAINST OPPONENTS OR SUSPECTED OPPONENTS OF THE REGIME WITHOUT ANY RESPECT FOR HUMAN RIGHTS OBLIGATIONS ... IT APPEARS THAT IN THE COURSE OF OPERATIONS, ALL KINDS OF SOPHISTICATED WEAPONS, IN PARTICULAR THOSE THAT HAVE A HEAVY DESTRUCTIVE AND PSYCHOLOGICAL EFFECT, ARE BEING USED. THE TARGET IS PRIMARILY THE CIVILIAN POPULATION, THE VILLAGES, AND THE AGRICULTURAL STRUCTURE...AS A RESULT, NOT ONLY INDIVIDUALS, BUT WHOLE GROUPS OF PERSONS AND TRIBES ARE ENDANGERED IN THEIR EXISTENCE AND IN THEIR LIVES BECAUSE THEIR LIVING CONDITIONS ARE FUNDAMENTALLY AFFECTED BY THE KIND OF WARFARE BEING WAGED", WHICH INCLUDES "THE INDISCRIMINATE MASS KILLINGS OF CIVILIANS, PARTICULARLY WOMEN AND CHILDREN" AND

THE "USE OF ANTI-PERSONAL MINES AND OF SO CALLED TOY BOMBS", WHICH ARE DROPPED FROM HELICOPTERS AND INTENDED TO MAIM, NOT KILL, THE CHILDREN WHO TEND TO PICK UP SUCH THINGS.

THIS INDEPENDENT ACCOUNT BY THE UNITED NATIONS DEMONSTRATES THAT THE SOVIETS IN AFGHANISTAN ARE ENGAGED IN PRACTICES WHICH, UNDER ARTICLE II OF THE INTERNATIONAL CONVENTION ON THE PREVENTION AND PUNISHMENT OF THE CRIME OF GENOCIDE, SIGNED ON BEHALF OF THE U.S. ON DECEMBER 11, 1948, APPEAR TO AMOUNT TO THE CRIME OF GENOCIDE. THE CONVENTIONS' DEFINITION OF THAT CRIME IS THE WILLFUL ACT OF DESTROYING IN WHOLE OR PART A NATIONAL, ETHNIC, RACIAL, OR RELIGIOUS GROUP BY, AMONG OTHER THINGS: KILLING MEMBERS OF THE GROUP; CAUSING SERIOUS BODILY OR MENTAL HARM TO MEMBERS OF THE GROUP; AND DELIBERATLY INFLECTING ON THE GROUP CONDITIONS OF LIFE CALCULATED TO BRING ABOUT ITS PHYSICAL DESTRUCTION IN WHOLE OR IN PART.

ON JUNE 25, 1986, I OFFERED AN AMENDMENT, ALONG WITH THE DISTINGUISHED SENATOR FROM NEW HAMPSHIRE, ENTITLED

"POLICY TOWARD AFGHANISTAN", TO THE OMNIBUS DIPLOMATIC SECURITY AND ANTITERRORISM ACT OF 1986, WHICH THE SENATE UNANIMOUSLY ADOPTED. PART OF THE POLICY WE PROPOSED ADDRESSED THE QUESTION OF GENOCIDE, AND CALLED UPON THE SECRETARY OF STATE TO INVESTIGATE WHETHER THE SOVIETS ARE VIOLATING THEIR OBLIGATIONS UNDER THE GENOCIDE CONVENTION. FURTHERMORE, THE AMENDMENT ASKED FOR A REVIEW OF OUR CONTINUED DIPLOMATIC PRESENCE IN KABUL. FOLLOWING UP ON THIS INITIATIVE, SENATOR HUMPHREY AND I ADDRESSED A LETTER TO THE SECRETARY OF STATE REQUESTING HIS APPRAISAL OF THE SITUATION. THE STATE DEPARTMENT INFORMED US THAT EFFORTS ARE BEING MADE TO DETERMINE WHETHER OR NOT GENOCIDE, AS STRICTLY DEFINED UNDER THE GENOCIDE CONVENTION, CAN ASSUREDLY BE APPLIED TO THE ATROCITIES THAT ARE BEING COMMITTED AGAINST THE AFGHAN PEOPLE. OUR DIPLOMATIC PRESENCE HAS BEEN DESCRIBED AS SKELETAL, AND IS REPORTED TO HAVE NO DIRECT COMMUNICATION WITH THE PUPPET REGIME



INSTALLED IN KABUL. WE CONTINUE TO AWAIT THE SECRETARY'S EVALUATION OF THE QUESTION OF GENOCIDE.

IN SPITE OF CONTINUING SOVIET ATTEMPTS TO DESTROY THE SPIRIT OF THE AFGHAN PEOPLE, THE MORALE OF THE FREEDOM FIGHTERS IS HIGH, AND CIVILIAN SUPPORT FOR THEM IS STRONG. NEITHER THE RESISTANCE NOR THE AFGHAN PEOPLE ARE SUCCUMBING TO SOVIET PRESSURES. FEAR IS AN INSTINCT SEEMINGLY UNKNOWN TO THIS FIERCE AND PROUD PEOPLE. IN 1985, THERE WERE REPORTS OF HEAVY AIR AND ARTILLERY ATTACKS BY THE SOVIETS ON PRO-RESISTANCE VILLAGES, WITH THE OBJECTIVE OF DENYING THE FREEDOM FIGHTERS ACCESS TO THE LOCAL POPULATION FOR SUPPORT. THIS CAMPAIGN ADVERSLY AFFECTED THE FREEDOM FIGHTERS' ABILITY TO BLEND INTO THE POPULATION AND LIVE OFF THE LAND. HOWEVER, BY 1986, THE RESISTANCE WAS REPORTED TO BE INCREASINGLY BETTER ARMED, TRAINED, AND ORGANIZED. AN ARTICLE IN THE FEBRUARY 9, 1987 EDITION OF THE WASHINGTON POST INDICATED THAT THE RESISTANCE IS HAVING SPECTACULAR SUCCESS WITH THE STINGER ANTI-AIRCRAFT MISSILES. AS

REPORTED, THE MISSILES, SHIPPED THERE LATE LAST SPRING, WERE FIRST USED EXTENSIVELY IN OCTOBER. REPORTS HAVE ESTIMATED THAT SOVIET AND AFGHAN AIRCRAFT HAVE BEEN DOWNED AT THE RATE OF ONE A DAY, AND THE EFFECTIVENESS OF THE MISSILES IS EVIDENT IN THE CHANGES THAT HAVE BEEN DETECTED IN TACTICS USED BY SOVIET PILOTS.

I HOPE THAT SOVIET POLICY WOULD BE ALTERED IN RESPONSE TO THE FIERCE DETERMINATION OF THE AFGHAN PEOPLE TO FIGHT TO RETAIN THEIR SOVEREIGN RIGHT TO EXIST AS AN INDEPENDENT NATION. MR. GORBACHEV HAS RECENTLY MADE SOME SWEEPING AND PROGRESSIVE PROPOSALS, AND I LOOK FORWARD TO THE DAY WHEN THE HOPES THAT HE HAS RAISED FOR A CHANGE IN SOVIET POLICY TOWARD AFGHANISTAN ARE TRANSLATED INTO ACTION, THE TRUE TEST OF HIS WORDS. SO FAR, UNFORTUNATELY, WORDS ARE ALL THE SOVIETS HAVE PROVIDED IN THEIR ATTEMPT TO PORTRAY THEMSELVES AS REASONABLE IN APPROACHING THEIR PROBLEM IN AFGHANISTAN. MR. GORBACHEV, WHO ENTERED INTO POWER FREE FROM THE YOKE OF RESPONSIBILITY FOR THE SOVIET OCCUPATION, WILL INEVITABLY

MAKE THIS WAR HIS OWN IF ACTION, SPECIFICALLY SWIFT MILITARY WITHDRAWAL, IS NOT TAKEN TO RESTORE SOVEREIGN POWER TO THE PEOPLE OF AFGHANISTAN.

IN SEPTEMBER 1985, I LED A BIPARTISIAN SENATE DELEGATION TO MOSCOW WHERE WE MET WITH GENERAL SECRETARY GORBACHEV. I INDICATED TO HIM AT THAT TIME THAT A CONTINUATION OF SOVIET ATTEMPTS TO SUBJUGATE AFGHANISTAN WOULD CONTINUE TO SOUR U.S.-SOVIET RELATIONS, AND BE AN IMPEDIMENT TO A BETTER SUPERPOWER RELATIONSHIP. WE TOLD HIM THAT IT WAS WITHIN HIS POWER TO END THE WAR IN AFGHANISTAN BY REMOVING ALL SOVIET FORCES.

IN A RESOLUTION ADOPTED JANUARY 6, 1987, THE SENATE REITERATED THIS POINT AND PROMISED TO CONTINUE TO PROVIDE APPROPRIATE MATERIAL AND MORAL SUPPORT TO THE AFGHAN FREEDOM FIGHTERS UNTIL THE TIME THAT THE SOVIETS ACT ON THEIR PROPOSALS OF WITHDRAWAL. THE RESOLUTION URGED THE SOVIET UNION TO PROPOSE AT THE UNITED NATIONS-SPONSORED INDIRECT NEGOTIATIONS A TIMETABLE FOR A COMPLETE WITHDRAWAL WITHIN A

FOUR MONTH TIME FRAME. THE NEGOTIATIONS ARE SCHEDULED TO BEGIN NEXT WEEK ON FEBRUARY 23.

THE RESOLUTION ALSO CALLS FOR:

"THE RETURN OF AN INDEPENDENT AND NONALIGNED STATUS TO AFGHANISTAN, AND A PEACEFUL POLITICAL SETTLEMENT ACCEPTABLE TO THE PEOPLE OF AFGHANISTAN, INCLUDING PROVISION FOR THE RETURN OF AFGHAN REFUGEES IN SAFETY AND DIGNITY."

SOVIET ACTIVITIES IN AFGHANISTAN ARE REPUGNANT TO ALL FREEDOM LOVING PEOPLE. UNTIL THE TIME THAT THE SOVIETS REMOVE THEIR FORCES FROM AFGHANISTAN, I WILL CONTINUE TO QUESTION THEIR RESPECT FOR THE PRINCIPLES OF INTERNATIONAL LAW AND PEACEFUL PRACTICES, AND I WILL CONTINUE TO SUPPORT VIGOROUS MATERIEL ASSISTANCE, AND MORAL ASSISTANCE TO THE COURAGEOUS STRUGGLE OF THE AFGHAN PEOPLE.

1 Secretary Shultz. I want to quote that letter back to you, if  
2 I may.

3       You say in the last paragraph: "In our policy toward  
4 Afghanistan, we need to hold fast to our principles: all  
5 Soviet troops and military advisors out of Afghanistan; the  
6 country's sovereignty restored and guaranteed; and the Afghans  
7 left free to determine their own political future." These,  
8 it seems to me, are the only guidelines we need, the guide-  
9 lines to which we must adhere.

10       And then the final sentence of the letter is just as  
11 important, in my judgment. I quote again. "These goals can  
12 best be secured when the resistance is confident of our sup-  
13 port and the Soviets are certain of our determination." That,  
14 it seems to me, really says it all.

15       Insofar as we now have credible evidence that the Soviets  
16 are beginning to hurt, that the costs of this brutal aggres-  
17 sion are mounting up even higher than they may be willing or  
18 able to continue paying, and costs that we also have credible  
19 evidence to believe are being felt even within Soviet society  
20 and among the Soviet people themselves, insofar as this evi-  
21 dence is mounting, what then? Is this, as many diplomats in  
22 the United States and elsewhere in the Free World would  
23 counsel, is this the time to ease up? Is this the time to  
24 relent? It seems to me the answer is brutally clear: absol-  
25 utely not. Precisely to the contrary, this is the time to

maintain the pressure and, if possible, to increase it.

This brings me to make a brief comment about the so-called U.N. proximity talks, now again underway in Geneva under the aegis of the Special Negotiator.

There are many flaws, each of them probably fatal, in my judgment, to these talks. One, and the most obvious one, is that the critical party is not directly represented at the table -- I speak, of course, of the people of Afghanistan.

A second flaw is the perception that probably is abroad among the people of the leadership of Afghanistan -- I speak, of course, of the leadership of the Mujahideen -- the perception that the future of their country is being bargained over their heads, and even under the table, and the ultimate danger that it may be bargained away under the terms of some quick fix, a fiction or facade of Soviet withdrawal, leaving the puppet government securely in place in Kabul.

Now, as I say all of this, of course, the only guarantor that I can think of against such an outcome is the Afghan people themselves. I do not doubt that they would continue the struggle along, if need be, and for as many years as there may be an Afghan left alive. Clearly, however, we hope we need not rely on that last guarantee.

I have said, and I repeat, that this is the time not only to maintain the pressure but to step it up in every conceivable way. Let me try, in the briefest

possible fashion, simply to mention some of the directions in which that enhanced pressure might go.

The first and most important, obviously, is a continuation of the supply of all possible military material, all that can be put to effective use by the Mujahideen and the most sophisticated, in the largest possible quantities.

A second obvious item is full support for the very gutsy actions of the Government of Pakistan. I have very little question in my mind of their will and determination, but I must wonder whether they have the same confidence that we will stay the course.

Now, beyond that, what else? I confess to you that there is a hint of cosmetics in some of what I am about to say, but I would argue that these may be important cosmetics and that they should be considered.

In the first place, I have absolutely no doubt in my mind that the United States should forthwith break diplomatic relations with the puppet regime in Kabul. I can see no conceivable profit in maintaining the fiction of normal diplomatic relationships. I am not compelled by anything that I have ever been told of the "invaluable intelligence product" that is to be gained thereby.

Senator Humphrey. I'm sorry. Will you repeat that last sentence?

Ambassador Lichenstein. I have not heard any compelling

evidence that there is such invaluable intelligence information to be garnered by the continuation of a small mission in Kabul which is scarcely able to move outside of its own compound, and considering also that we have many sources of information about what is going on on the ground in the contested areas, the areas in which, for example, the Medicin sans Frontiere of France, the marvelous medical teams operate, or the occasion television reporters -- even our old friend Dan Rather. There are many, many sources of information.

I cannot see that the value of maintaining U.S. diplomatic relationships with the Kabul regime could in any way overbalance the dramatic message that we would be sending by breaking those relations.

By the same token, I think we should give very serious considerations to seeking a way to recognize a legitimate people's government of Afghanistan, to recognize the joint alliance of the Mujahideen leadership. One would hope that such a government could have an establishment within the territory of Afghanistan itself, but such a group could even be recognized if it were headquartered in New York or Washington, Islamabad, or any other point on the face of the Earth. Again, I think there is a great political profit in the message that such recognition would send of our will and of our determination.

A third option that I would consider -- and I've talked



about this with some members of your own staff, Mr. Chairman, and have occasionally expressed a bit of dubiousness about the merit, but I have thought and thought about it and I have come to a somewhat different conclusion than I have previously reached -- has to do with actions that we might undertake at the United Nations.

I think it would be an extremely healthy thing for the United States, at the very next session of the U.N., the 42nd Session of the General Assembly, to do two things: first of all, to insist on inserting into the famous Afghan Resolution, which was passed by these overwhelming majorities, the one word that does not and never has appeared in that Resolution, and that word is "Soviet". I think we should stop the fiction that we are talking about the withdrawal of "foreign" troops from Afghanistan and we should start talking about -- openly and explicitly -- the withdrawal of "Soviet" troops from Afghanistan. To the best of my knowledge, they are the only "foreign" troops that have intruded aggressively, brutally, into the territory of Afghanistan.

And I would do a second thing. I would invite the Islamic Conference -- 46 nations, if I remember correctly -- at the United Nations, I would invite them to join in this initiative. If they did not wish to do so, I would recommend that the U.S. Mission to the United Nations undertake it by itself; that is to table a motion before the General Assembly

1 at the very first session of the 42nd, that the Kabul puppet  
2 representatives be dismissed from the General Assembly of the  
3 United Nations and that the Afghan seat be occupied by a  
4 legitimate representative of the legitimate government of the  
5 people.

6 Senator Humphrey. Permit me to interject on the state-  
7 ment, that this, of course, is exactly what the New York Times  
8 has called for in a recent editorial.

9 Ambassador Lichenstein. I welcome friends from whatever  
10 unlikely source, Mr. Chairman. The New York Times occasionally  
11 does astonish one. Perhaps there is something to be said for  
12 "born-again adherence" to the cause of freedom. But I welcome  
13 any support.

14 A final move also involves the United Nations. To every-  
15 one's astonishment, including my own, the Special Rapporteur,  
16 the incredibly bold and wise representative of Austria, Dr.  
17 Felix Ermacora -- he is not an official representative of the  
18 government of Austria; he is a distinguished academic within  
19 that country -- to everyone's astonishment, Dr. Ermacora, in  
20 1985, produced a detailed, thoroughgoing report on Soviet  
21 atrocities, on Soviet human rights violations, within Afghan-  
22 istan. And to everyone's additional astonishment, the report  
23 was published. In 1986, he produced a similar report. And not  
24 to my astonishment, at any rate, the Soviets finally woke up  
25 to what was going on and they put a stop to this.

And so they tore the report into two pieces. The first 27 pages, quite detailed but not wholly specific as to atrocity-by-atrocity, the first 27 pages were published in all six official languages of the United Nations. The final 13 pages, which contained all of the specificity, was published only in a limited edition and only in the English language because, of course, of the stringent financial pinch that the United Nations was suffering during the 41st General Assembly.

An objection was raised to this--it can only be described as a suppression of the Ermacora annex. I said to myself at the time, and I say it again--and perhaps you might want to write another letter to your friend, the Secretary of State, and make the proposal to him yourself--why doesn't the United States, why does not the State Department of the United States publish this document, in all of the official languages of the United Nations, quite specifically including the Russian language; and why is it not distributed to every mission at the United Nations in New York and, indeed, to every government with which we maintain normal diplomatic relationships; and why is it also not published in tens of thousands of additional copies and distributed through USIA libraries in every information center maintained by this country everywhere in the world? And why is it not read in all of the appropriate languages over the radio services of the Voice of America and of Radio Free Europe and of Radio

1 Liberty?

2 I think all of this would be a very healthy fulfillment  
3 of the official record, and I think also it would send the  
4 same kind of message, the same kind of signal, to which I  
5 have referred from the beginning of these remarks, a reaffirm-  
6 ation that we are determined, that we do have the will to  
7 stay the course, and that we have no intention of looking  
8 for any easy way out.

9 Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman.

10 Senator Humphrey. Thank you.

11 Ambassador Lichenstein. Has your distinguished colleague  
12 arrived?

13 Senator Humphrey. Don't worry. You'll know when he  
14 gets here.

15 Ambassador Lichenstein. All right.

16 Senator Humphrey. Thank you very much, Mr. Ambassador.

17 I wanted to welcome Congressman Sander Levin, who has  
18 been a faithful member of the committee and shares a very  
19 deep commitment to human rights.

20 Congressman, thank you for coming. Do you care to make  
21 a statement or put some questions?

22 Mr. Levin. No. I'm sorry I arrived late and I'm going  
23 to have to leave. I wanted very much to hear as much of the  
24 testimony as I could, and I will read the rest. I'm sorry I  
25 missed most of the Ambassador's presentation. But you have

some interesting suggestions.

Let me, if I might, just ask one question that recurs, that relates to the future. Hopefully the Soviet troops -- and they are Soviet troops, not foreign troops -- will leave. Based on your knowledge of the history of the country, what do you think would evolve in Afghanistan after the Soviet troops leave? What kind of a society do you think would eventuate in the country?

Ambassador Lichenstein. I would hope, Congressman Levin, that a society and a governmental system would evolve which would be probably -- and I'm using this term in the technical social science sense -- a traditionalist kind of a government. It is a traditionally-based society, with strong village, community, and group leadership.

The kinds of processes that might evolve in such a society would not necessarily look like the typical democratic political processes of our own free and open society, but that would probably be unnatural in Afghanistan.

I would assume that there would be representative institutions in such a government. There would be a legislature, to which Mr. Areef himself referred before you arrived. In due course elections would be held from the natural, local regions of the country; and out of this, without outside interference, and without the imposition of outside authority, the Afghan people would slowly begin to

1 rebuild their society and the structure of that society, which  
2 has been so horribly ravaged; almost literally, not only have  
3 the people but the land of Afghanistan has been destroyed in  
4 vast areas.

5 It is going to be a long, slow process, but I think that  
6 with our help and encouragement, and the help of its immediate  
7 neighbors -- and I speak, of course, of Pakistan and the other  
8 Islamic countries of the world -- I do not doubt that these  
9 institutions can be rebuilt.

10 Mr. Levin. Thank you.

11 Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

12 Senator Humphrey. Mr. Ambassador, as you know, the State  
13 Department each year issues a press statement on Afghanistan.  
14 This year, Acting Secretary John Whitehead, who was Acting  
15 Secretary at the time -- I guess the Secretary must have been  
16 indisposed that day or something, at least that's what it  
17 says here -- anyway, the Acting Secretary, or the Deputy  
18 Secretary --

19 Ambassador Lichenstein. He's Deputy Secretary of State.

20 Senator Humphrey. -- made the statement this year for  
21 the State Department. In the last part of his remarks he  
22 says, "As we approach the seventh anniversary of the Soviet  
23 invasion of Afghanistan, it is clear that only steadily in-  
24 creasing pressure on all fronts, military, political, and  
25 diplomatic, will induce the Soviets to make the political

1 decision to negotiate the withdrawal of all of their forces"  
2 and so on.

3 You noted that the alliance forces have enjoyed increased  
4 successes, militarily, in recent months, but in these other  
5 realms, political and diplomatic, can you cite any steps that  
6 our Government has taken in the last couple of years to bring  
7 increased political and diplomatic pressure on the Soviet  
8 Union?

9 Ambassador Lichenstein. Mr. Chairman, I cannot specif-  
10 ically. But my best guess, and my hope, would be that what  
11 Deputy Secretary Whitehead might be referring to is the  
12 clearer and sharper reiteration of what we have come to call  
13 the "Reagan doctrine". I would hope and assume that when the  
14 President met with General Secretary Gorbachev in Geneva,  
15 and possibly again in Reykjavik, that he raised and raised, in  
16 a strong and urgent manner, the question of Afghanistan  
17 among other, as they are now called, regional conflicts.

18 I'm a born again linkage advocate, Mr. Chairman, and all  
19 I mean by linkage is that no opportunity should pass but what  
20 the leadership of our Government and of our country reiterate,  
21 at whatever level, to the Soviets that we mean business and  
22 that we are not going to relent, that we're not doing it in  
23 our own interest alone, but we are doing it in the interest  
24 of the Afghan people.

25 Senator Humphrey. Should that effort be limited only to

1 verbal protests?

2 Ambassador Lichenstein. I am suggesting steps, Mr.  
3 Chairman, beyond that.

4 Senator Humphrey. Such as?

5 Ambassador Lichenstein. I am suggesting, for example,  
6 breaking diplomatic relations with Kabul. I am suggesting  
7 recognition of the alliance and the Mujahideen as the legitim-  
8 ate government of Afghanistan. I am suggesting actions within  
9 the United Nations which would underscore those political and  
10 diplomatic initiatives.

11 I wish I had a list of 20 or 30 such. I cannot. I can  
12 only say that I would take every opportunity that presented  
13 itself to make and remake the same point.

14 Senator Humphrey. Those are excellent suggestions, and  
15 putting them into practice is long overdue. But, then, you're  
16 not the Secretary of State, as you have --

17 Ambassador Lichenstein. No. I suppose the nation can  
18 thank itself for small favors.

19 Senator Humphrey. My point is that -- and I'm not  
20 criticizing Secretary Whitehead or anyone else, any other  
21 person. But I am criticizing this dichotomy between our  
22 grand statements and our daily deeds. The State Department  
23 says that we need to increase pressure on all fronts, and the  
24 military pressure has been increased at long, long, last. It  
25 could have been done and should have been done years ago, and



1 probably would have resulted in a shortening of this terrible  
2 war. In any case, it has finally been done to good effect.  
3 Military pressure has been increased.

4 As an observer, do you see -- as an observer who might  
5 see things that others might miss, who haven't served in the  
6 State Department -- as an observer, have you seen any increase  
7 in political pressure or diplomatic pressure brought about by  
8 our Government?

9 Ambassador Lichenstein. I must confess, Mr. Chairman,  
10 that I have not. But I go back to the point that some of the  
11 most valuable and some of the most telling of such pressure  
12 can only be exercised in ways that we would not know directly  
13 of, exercised not only by the Secretary but, of course, by  
14 the President. I'm confident that that kind of message is  
15 being conveyed.

16 I will also say, sir, that no political message is more  
17 forceful than the continued delivery of many carloads of  
18 desperately needed military equipment. That has a telling  
19 political effect beyond almost any other initiative that we  
20 could devise, and that is the kind of message that is received  
21 by the Soviets, in my judgment.

22 Senator Humphrey. I certainly agree with what you have  
23 said. But my point is that -- indeed, the State Department's  
24 point is, at least in rhetoric anyway, is that we need to  
25 bring all pressures to bear, increasing pressures, and we are

1 not, from all I can see, and apparently from all you can see,  
2 except in the military sphere, which is fine but it's not  
3 enough.

4 How would you advise -- this is my last question. How  
5 would you advise the alliance with respect to participation  
6 in any government of reconciliation, given the unfortunate  
7 results of such governments of reconciliation, including  
8 communist elements elsewhere?

9 Ambassador Lichenstein. They obviously, sir, are the  
10 only judges of whether the kind of government within which  
11 they are invited to participate is a genuine expression of  
12 the wishes of the people of Afghanistan.

13 I would follow their lead. If, in their judgment, the  
14 unacceptable upper cadres of the puppet regime have, as I  
15 suspect they would, left in the first unit of withdrawal of  
16 Soviet forces from Afghanistan --

17 Senator Humphrey. They will probably precede the first  
18 unit if they have any sense.

19 Ambassador Lichenstein. -- then clearly there will be  
20 leadership, some of them perhaps nominally communist, many of  
21 them from different factions of the Communist Party of Afghan-  
22 istan, who would be welcomed into a genuine government of  
23 reconciliation. But the leadership and the signal has to be  
24 given, in my judgment, by the leadership of the alliance, by  
25 the leadership of those who have been fighting for the

1 independence and autonomy of their country. I follow their  
2 guidance in this.

3 Senator Humphrey. Well, if Mr. Areef's opinion is  
4 typical of the other members of the alliance, I think there  
5 will be no communists in such a government, that, indeed,  
6 they won't participate in any so-called government of recon-  
7 ciliation on the basis of inclusion of communists.

8 Ambassador Lichenstein. People like Mr. Areef make me  
9 proud to be an anti-communist, Mr. Chairman.

10 Senator Humphrey. Thank you very much, Mr. Ambassador.

11 Ambassador Lichenstein. Thank you very much for the  
12 opportunity.

13 Senator Humphrey. Now we will ask Dr. Richard Pipes,  
14 Professor of History at Harvard University, to come to the  
15 table.

16 Good morning, Dr. Pipes. I'm very sorry that you had  
17 to wait so long.

18 Dr. Pipes. May I say that my plane was late anyway.

19 Senator Humphrey. Let me just say that Senator Byrd is  
20 still tied up at the Intelligence Committee hearing on the  
21 nomination of Robert Gates and he might not be able to attend.  
22 But, in any case, we will send him a statement if he is unable  
23 to attend.

24 You may proceed, Dr. Pipes.

1                   STATEMENT OF RICHARD PIPES, PROFESSOR OF  
2                   HISTORY, HARVARD UNIVERSITY

3           Dr. Pipes. I have a brief statement to make. First of  
4 all, I would like to congratulate you and your colleagues in  
5 holding these hearings, not only because they keep the issue  
6 of Afghanistan alive in the public conscience, but also be-  
7 cause the records of these hearings, which I have gone through,  
8 provide some of the best sources of information on what goes on  
9 in Afghanistan and what foreign reactions are. I highly  
10 recommend, for anyone interested in the subject, to read them.

11           With your permission, my remarks will be confined largely  
12 to Soviet policies vis-a-vis Afghanistan, current and future,  
13 because the Soviet Union is my specialty. I do not possess  
14 any deep knowledge of events within Afghanistan.

15           The first question of why is Soviet Russia in Afghanistan,  
16 this can be answered in two ways, a more general way and a more  
17 specific way. More generally, it is there because Russia has  
18 a long tradition of expansion which goes back to the 14th  
19 Century to the origins of the State, which has to do largely  
20 with the poverty of the land, its inability to produce suf-  
21 ficient wealth, and the belief deeply embedded in the mind of  
22 Russian leaders that conquest is the way to assert your power  
23 and your sovereignty. Russians will tell you that a country  
24 that does not expand is a country that withers.

25           This, of course, is no longer true in the 20th Century.

1 They haven't awakened to this yet. They believe, for example,  
2 that when the western empires have given up, the great powers  
3 of the West will collapse when, in fact, the very opposite has  
4 happened. They have become much richer. But they haven't  
5 learned that lesson yet, so they do believe in expansion.

6 Now, more specifically in Afghanistan, they are really  
7 starved from expanding into Europe by NATO and in the east  
8 by China and, therefore, naturally, the Middle East is the  
9 easiest avenue for the Soviet Union to expand. Afghanistan,  
10 for which they've had an interest for over a century -- they  
11 tried to take Afghanistan in the late 19th Century -- is an  
12 obvious choice.

13 You will notice that deeper in Asia, east Asia, the  
14 Russians have occupied Mongolia, which is kind of a protuber-  
15 ance in the middle of China, where they have an enormous  
16 number of troops which threaten China. Afghanistan can per-  
17 form the same function for the same function in the Middle  
18 East, a springboard. It is very similar to that.

19 Now, I think that originally they had hoped not to have  
20 to invade Afghanistan, and I agree with those who think they  
21 thought they could clean it up in three to six months and get  
22 out. But it hasn't worked that way and they're in there now.  
23 And they're in there, I think, for good.

24 I am extremely skeptical and, indeed, pessimistic, about  
25 the possibility of getting the Soviet Union out of Afghanistan.

1 I agree with Edward Litvak, whose testimony I read here -- I  
2 think he gave it last year -- in which he said that ultimately  
3 nothing but defeat in the battlefield will make the Russians  
4 retreat. And even that is not a very likely prospect. The  
5 Russians have a lot of experience in pacifying such areas  
6 along their frontier. They will tell you it took them 30  
7 years to conquer the Northern Caucasus; it took them almost  
8 as much to conquer Central Asia; and they will tell you they  
9 are prepared to be there for as long as is required to grind  
10 the resistance down and occupy the region. They have a lot  
11 of experience in dealing with that.

12 In the United States there is much too much preoccupation  
13 with the military aspects of the Soviet invasion of Afghani-  
14 stan. We think of it as a primarily military operation.  
15 This, I think, is a mistake. The Soviet Union uses military  
16 power as only one of the ingredients of its imperialism, and  
17 not necessarily always the most important. They also use  
18 economic measures, political measures, psychological measures,  
19 educational measures -- they all form one big package.

20 The reported transport of thousands of Afghan children  
21 to Russia is meant to create a cadre of youths who have no  
22 other families but for those which the Soviet Union provides.  
23 The transformation and educational system in Afghanistan to  
24 teach Marxism-Leninism mainly produces the desired result.  
25 But at least it provides a kind of psychological, intellectual

1 wedge into the culture of Afghanistan.

2 I am surprised that years after we're told that the  
3 Afghan Government army was supposed to have been completely  
4 crushed that its units are still continuously fighting, like  
5 cattle for the Soviet troops to be slaughtered, but there they  
6 are, which is also somewhat ominous. I think all of this is  
7 rather neglected.

8 Last but not least, economic measures. There is very  
9 clearly a determination to so destroy the economic base of  
10 Afghanistan that the Afghan population will become dependent  
11 on the authorities. They did the same thing in the Soviet  
12 Union in the immediate aftermath of the revolution, when they  
13 staunchly insisted in 1918 and 1919 and 1920 on having a  
14 monopoly on the grain trade, forbidding peasants to deliver  
15 food to the cities and buying food from the peasants at such  
16 ridiculously low prices that the peasants refused to grow it,  
17 with a result that in 1921 a famine broke out, the largest and  
18 worst famine in the history of Europe with five million casual-  
19 ties. But that made the population docile.

20 They are doing the same thing in Ethiopia right now,  
21 transplanting hundreds of thousands of rebellious people,  
22 with attendant massive deaths, and they will do that in Afghan-  
23 istan maybe. I don't believe there is that famine in Afghan-  
24 istan yet, but they will destroy the underlying -- the economic  
25 infrastructure. They're essentially a poor country and it

1 will, in their opinion, come to terms.

2       These are facts which need to be stressed, which are not  
3 sufficiently stressed, because it is basically the military  
4 aspect of it that so preoccupies us as a government.

5       When I was in the National Security Council in 1981, I  
6 recall a Soviet proposal, very much like the present one,  
7 namely, that there will be a phased withdrawal of Soviet  
8 troops without a timetable, accompanied by the suspension of  
9 further aid to the Mujahideen.

10       This was so outrageous that I couldn't believe that  
11 anybody would take this seriously, but I must say, regret-  
12 fully, that there are a number of people high up in the State  
13 Department who thought it was a rather good proposal. But it  
14 was rejected and has been rejected since. I now have no  
15 access to any classified information. The Russians still  
16 maintain the same proposal, though some adjustments have been  
17 made, and apparently they're discussing with the United Nations  
18 the timetables. But it seems to me absolutely clear that  
19 none of this would work unless the suspension of assistance  
20 is coincidental, concurrent, with the withdrawal of Soviet  
21 troops. There is no reason that the Soviet troops, which  
22 took days to march into Afghanistan, should take more than  
23 days to get out of Afghanistan. The operation should be just  
24 as rapid.

25       The prospect in my mind looks bleak, not because I don't



1 have faith in the Afghans being willing to fight; they  
2 obviously are extraordinary people and they don't calculate  
3 the correlation of forces the way, say, the Czechs did in  
4 1968. They do what they think is right.

5 But the world is neglectful, indifferent. The Islamic  
6 world in particular is indifferent. They are left very much  
7 to themselves. It seems to me that the best hope they have  
8 is of receiving unstinting military aid from the West, and  
9 from such countries in the East and Far East as are willing  
10 to help them, so they inflict really a smashing defeat on the  
11 Russians. I don't mean a pitched battle in which they defeat  
12 Soviet troops, but that they so drain the Soviet Union that  
13 it sees no hope in victory. Then perhaps they would be  
14 willing to settle for a face-saving device of some kind. On  
15 that I think we should help them to find such a face-saving  
16 device.

17 I am afraid that, despite the peace talks of Mr. Gorba-  
18 chev, as reported today on the front page of the New York  
19 Times, there is no evidence whatsoever that the Soviet foreign  
20 policy since Gorbachev has taken over two years ago has mod-  
21 ified itself.

22 Gorbachev says -- and it's logical what he says -- that  
23 in order to carry out the reforms which he wishes to carry  
24 out, he has to have peace. That is true, logically. But  
25 politically this is not so. Politically, in order to be able

1 to fend off a position to his reforms, he has to maintain a  
2 very tough stance abroad. He has to be tough, he has to  
3 militarize, he has to wage the war in Afghanistan and win  
4 it, and do all these things which will win him support, or  
5 at least neutralize the opposition. So I think there is very  
6 little hope that a growing stress on internal reform is going  
7 to cause the Russians to pull out.

8 I conclude with what I said before, that it is only, to  
9 my mind, really a military defeat of some sort that will  
10 persuade the Russians to pull out, if anything ever will.

11 Thank you.

12 Senator Humphrey. Thank you for your statement. It's  
13 disturbing, but very interesting.

14 Apart from his political problems, do you think that Mr.  
15 Gorbachev is sincere in his statements about peace in recent  
16 months, or is that just a cynical manipulation of internation-  
17 al public opinion?

18 Dr. Pipes. Well, the Soviet attitude to peace always  
19 reminds me of what I used to say in the Thirties about Hitler,  
20 when I used to say "Does Hitler want peace?" And the answer  
21 was, "Yes, he wants peace, a piece of Czechoslovakia, a  
22 piece of Poland" and so on. He's sincere about that kind of  
23 "piece", definitely.

24 No, there is no question -- again, if I may allude to  
25 what Napoleon once said. "The aggressor always wants peace."

1 The aggressor wants to take everything peacefully. He doesn't  
2 want resistance. He doesn't want to fight for it. That kind  
3 of peace he wants.

4 Does he sincerely want a world which is stable, where  
5 relations between nations are conducted in a fashion that we  
6 think are normal -- well, I don't know what's in his mind, of  
7 course; I don't think anybody knows. But, I would say the  
8 conditions under which he has to operate are such that he  
9 cannot have it.

10 That is, I think his number one priority is internal  
11 reform, particularly economic reform, and to achieve that, he  
12 must win over, or at least neutralize, the Stalinists, the  
13 "Stalinoids," and the various reactionaries who benefit by  
14 the status quo. And to do that, he has to say that he is  
15 tough, that he is not yielding to Western pressures and so on.

16 It's very interesting. He made this remark time and  
17 again, that the West doesn't want reforms, the West wants  
18 Russia to be the way it is, and therefore, by implication,  
19 anybody who resists reforms is a Western agent. Those are  
20 the complexities of the Soviet system.

21 Senator Humphrey. So you feel the only solution is to  
22 increase or to maintain military pressure?

23 Dr. Pipes. Yes. Of course, all the other things about  
24 which Ambassador Lichenstein has spoken are very, very im-  
25 portant -- breaking relations and so on -- but the decision

1 will be reached I think on the battlefields of Afghanistan  
2 and no where else.

3 Senator Humphrey. In testimony before this committee  
4 last year, former National Security Advisor Brzezinski  
5 complained of what he termed "managerial neglect" in our  
6 conduct of our policy towards Afghanistan.

7 Did you happen to read that testimony?

8 Dr. Pipes. No, that I have not read, no.

9 What did he mean by "managerial neglect"?

10 Senator Humphrey. I think his complaint is essentially  
11 the same as I have been voicing, that we get lots of lofty  
12 rhetoric, but in the day-to-day management that you would  
13 depend upon to turn rhetoric into policy is missing. There  
14 is no one in charge of our Afghanistan effort. The responsi-  
15 bility is diffused throughout the Government. I can't put  
16 words into his mouth, but I think he was saying that we could  
17 do far better if the program were better managed.

18 How do you feel about the management of our Afghan  
19 efforts?

20 Dr. Pipes. Well, I think that is true. Afghanistan is  
21 not high up on the priority list of the Government, the State  
22 Department in particular. I am disturbed by the fact that in  
23 recent speeches of the President and so on Afghanistan is  
24 even not mentioned at all, or is just mentioned in passing.

25 I remember myself when I was in the White House, we went

1 over the President's Christmas 1981 speech -- it was primaril  
2 about Poland, of course -- but there was not a word about  
3 Afghanistan. In driving home I suddenly realized it wasn't  
4 there and I telephoned, and just because I called a sentence  
5 was inserted. But there was no one to watch for this to,  
6 in fact, happen.

7 It is extremely important because the Russians read  
8 these signals, and if they see the President or Secretary of  
9 State have no mention of Afghanistan, then they assume that  
10 Afghanistan is forgotten.

11 Senator Humphrey. Yes, right.

12 Dr. Pipes. There has to be a watch dog, definitely.

13 Senator Humphrey. I certainly agree with what you're  
14 saying. On the one hand we have these inspiring statements  
15 by the President and the Secretary of State on the anniversar  
16 date of the invasion, but on a daily basis it is really bus-  
17 iness as usual, if not business warmer and more friendly than  
18 usual.

19 Dr. Pipes. Sure. We have lifted most of the sanctions  
20 which were imposed in connection with Afghanistan.

21 Senator Humphrey. Is there a management reform needed  
22 at the National Security Council or elsewhere in our Govern-  
23 ment to ensure -- I believe the President is sincere about  
24 what he says about Afghanistan, but he is so busy with so  
25 many other issues that his intent is not fully carried out.

1 It is not fully carried out because -- Would you agree that  
2 it's not fully carried out because of managerial defects,  
3 structural defects, in the way we manage the program?

4 Dr. Pipes. Well, that is one aspect of it. I don't  
5 think you could do it in the National Security Council; it's  
6 too small for that. But in the State Department, a task force  
7 could be -- you know, we have these task forces all the time  
8 appointed, which meet regularly, an interagency group which  
9 meets, say, once a month to discuss what's happening, what's  
10 being done, and making recommendations. If you had such a  
11 task force, an interagency task force, you can keep an eye on  
12 things.

13 Senator Humphrey. I believe that there already is such  
14 a structure, and if you look at the results, it's just not  
15 working.

16 Is there some better way to do it? Would putting some  
17 single person in charge, someone with authority who could  
18 spend full time --

19 Dr. Pipes. I should think that would have to come from  
20 the top, where the Secretary of State says "I really want  
21 this to work." You know, you can set up anything you want,  
22 but if the people sitting on these groups feel that the people  
23 up above are not watching, then nothing happens. Invariably  
24 what occurs is they send the deputies and then the deputies  
25 send their deputies, and you get people of such low standing

1 that nothing gets done. So one has to persuade the people  
2 at the very top that this matters and make them understand  
3 this.

4 Senator Humphrey. Well, are you saying, then, that the  
5 failure to put the President's intent into action is a failure  
6 at the highest levels, for which --

7 Dr. Pipes. I'm afraid I've got to say this is not the  
8 only case where this happens.

9 Senator Humphrey. Are there any steps that you would  
10 recommend? Do you agree with all of the recommendations made  
11 by Ambassador Lichenstein?

12 Dr. Pipes. I heard everything he said and I fully agree  
13 with that. I have almost nothing to add to that, except  
14 making certain that the President and other high-level  
15 executive officers continuously refer to Afghanistan.

16 Now, that may seem like something quite useless, but I  
17 think that the Jewish organizations understand this very well.  
18 They have for years badgered Soviet officials about-- they  
19 have gotten so under their skin that they're finally giving  
20 up and releasing some of these people.

21 This may seem at some times to be utterly futile, but it  
22 isn't futile. You just talk about this, "Let my people go,  
23 get out of Afghanistan", you repeat it often enough and the  
24 refrain produces an echo. That is necessary for the highest  
25 officials to do because, as I have said before, the Russians,

in general, but particularly now that Mr. Dobrynin and his assistants are there, have a very keen understanding of how Washington operates. If Gorbachev were to ask Dobrynin "what do you think? Is Afghanistan an important issue in Washington", he would say no. "Well, there's a Senator who holds hearings on this sometimes." But, you know, the President doesn't mention it, and the Secretary of State makes his perfunctory statements, "it's not a hot issue and you needn't to worry about it."

So you have to persuade the people at the top to talk about it all the time, even if no results are obtained -- immediately, that is.

Senator Humphrey. I agree, and I'm afraid that you're probably right, that the Soviet reading is exactly as you say it is, that they see many, many signs that Afghanistan is not very high on the agenda and that our rhetoric really can be disregarded, or substantially disregarded. That's tragic, because that is precisely the opposite of what the State Department is calling for, bringing steadily increasing pressure.

Dr. Pipes. That verbal pressure is very, very important. The Russians appreciate words.

Senator Humphrey. Are you concerned about a sell out in any of these talks underway?

Dr. Pipes. Well, it's always in the back of my mind.



1 Senator Humphrey. Is there something the United States  
2 can do to ensure that any terms that are agreed to are just?

3 Dr. Pipes. You mean whether it could be a fair deal?

4 Senator Humphrey. Is there anything we could be doing,  
5 that we should be doing, to influence these talks to ensure  
6 the outcome is just, if there is an outcome?

7 Dr. Pipes. Well, I should think the Pakistanis in  
8 particular have to be notified of how we feel, that we are  
9 not ready to settle for just anything. I think that would  
10 probably embolden them to act in the proper fashion.

11 Senator Humphrey. Embolden them?

12 Dr. Pipes. Well, embolden them in the sense where, if  
13 they feel we are wavering, naturally, they are a small country  
14 with a great threat from the Soviet Union, they would waver,  
15 too. So it's extremely important for them to understand there  
16 will be no wavering, either by this administration or by an-  
17 other administration.

18 I mean, I think the Afghan cause enjoys tremendous support  
19 in this country. I lecture a considerable amount on the  
20 campuses of this country, and I'm always amazed at how popular  
21 the cause of Afghanistan is. I very often get questions from  
22 students as to why don't we do more for Afghanistan. These  
23 are not programmed questions. These are spontaneous questions.

24 So I would think that we're dealing here with something  
25 that is not specifically true of the Republican administration

1 or of President Reagan -- well, President Carter introduced  
2 the sanctions. This cuts across the board.

3 I think bipartisanship here, which exists, informing  
4 the Russians and informing the Pakistanis, and informing  
5 the United Nations officials, that we aren't going to retreat  
6 on this, that we back the Afghans, is very, very important.

7 Senator Humphrey. It's unfortunate, isn't it, that  
8 there is such widespread and bipartisan support for stronger  
9 policy, and yet, if anything -- except in the military  
10 sphere -- if anything, pressures have been reduced. Indeed,  
11 I know really of no political or diplomatic pressures, apart  
12 from the raising of the issue privately at various meetings  
13 with the Soviets, I know of no pressures, increased or other-  
14 wise. They're just not there. There not only aren't pres-  
15 sures, but there are, in fact, rewards.

16 I just saw the press statement the other day, where we  
17 had signed some new agreement with the Soviets -- I've for-  
18 gotten; it was minor in nature -- but it was just one further  
19 sign that it's business as usual.

20 Dr. Pipes. I think there are a lot of very well-meaning  
21 people in this country, but misled, who believe that coming  
22 to terms with the Soviet Union to prevent nuclear war, par-  
23 ticularly now with an administration that seems to want  
24 change, is so important that it overshadows anything else --  
25 human rights abuses, Afghanistan, Poland and so on. They are

misguided. Because it seems to me that what the Russians do in Afghanistan so contradicts their professions, that it should be taken as a truth, as a reality -- not the words -- but nevertheless, that is the motivation.

It is very unfortunate, and all of us who realize this is so try to do the best we can.

Senator Humphrey. This is perhaps getting off the subject just a little bit, but I think it's related. Mr. Gorbachev, as you say, is seen by many Westerners as a reformer, a man who is sincerely interested in changing the ways of the Soviet Union. We all hope that will come some day. We all hope there will be such a leader some day. I happen to believe there will. I don't know when it will be, but I can't believe they're going to continue to impose this stupidity and hardship on themselves that they have borne now for 60 years.

But Mr. Gorbachev does have that image. He's a very clever propagandist, in my opinion, a very clever public relations artist, and he has promoted this perception that he is a new breed, that he really wants to make these changes.

In any event, in your opinion, assuming that he does want to make changes, are his motivations surely pragmatic, or is there some recognition that the ethical and moral bases on which his government has been proceeding for these decades, is there some appreciation that those are flawed or lacking? Is it purely pragmatism, would you say?

1 Dr. Pipes. I think it is overwhelmingly pragmatism, that  
2 is, a realization on the part of the sort of people who advise  
3 him -- and their names are known to us, economists, political  
4 scientists and so on -- that the Soviet Union is in deep  
5 trouble. It is in crisis. And if something isn't done, the  
6 crisis will deepen, and no one knows what will happen. But  
7 certainly the Soviet Union will lose its status as a great  
8 world power.

9 Sakharov has been saying this. Sakharov has been inspired,  
10 partly by moral considerations, partly by patriotic consider-  
11 ations. But I think it's a patriotic element rather than an  
12 ethical one that has won them over.

13 Again, nobody knows what is deep in his heart and his  
14 mind. He is an unknown book to us. But the arguments used  
15 throughout are we must do this if we're going to stay a great  
16 power and if we want to avoid crisis. That is part of the  
17 Sakharov program. Sakharov has been saying this now for over  
18 ten years. It's interesting that Sakharov spoke yesterday  
19 for the first time at the conference, and the full text of what  
20 he said isn't there, but he seems to be backing Gorbachev.  
21 Because whether Gorbachev's motives are ethical or pragmatic,  
22 the movement is a good movement, a proper movement in the right  
23 direction.

24 Senator Humphrey. That's an interesting phenomenon and  
25 one that has some great dangers for us, if Mr. Gorbachev is

1 really a cynic and not a sincere man.

2           Getting back to Afghanistan and the West area I want to  
3 explore, to what extent -- getting back to our policy -- to  
4 what extent should there be linkage between the Soviet with-  
5 drawal of forces for Afghanistan and our relations with the  
6 Soviet Union?

7           Dr. Pipes. I think there would have to be. Of course,  
8 the Soviet Union wants to treat everything separately. In  
9 all their dealings with us, as I have observed them, the  
10 Soviet Union wants to deal with us only directly on bilateral  
11 issues, which are arms control, in the first place, trade in  
12 the second place, and cultural relations perhaps in the third  
13 place.

14           Whenever we raise issues with them concerning their be-  
15 havior in other parts of the globe, they absolutely shrug them  
16 off and refuse to talk about them. So if you mention the  
17 help to the Sandinistas, or what they're doing in Viet Nam  
18 or Afghanistan, they will say, "Look, that's none of your  
19 business. If you want to talk about Afghanistan, talk to the  
20 Afghan government." That, of course, is nonsense. It's a  
21 ploy and they use it very skillfully. But one can separate  
22 these things.

23           If our relations with the Soviet Union are to improve,  
24 then they have to improve across the board. You cannot reduce  
25 them entirely to bilateral relations, as we want them. We are

1 in a global situation, and when they or their agents do things  
2 in various parts of the globe, it concerns us directly.  
3 Therefore, there has to be linkage.

4 Now, some people say an exception should be made for arms  
5 control, and I could see perhaps, if one really arrives at  
6 some very, very meaningful and verifiable arms control accords,  
7 one could say this is so important that one may want to isolate  
8 it and come to terms if they are mutually advantageous.  
9 But other than that -- and this even does not seem very  
10 likely -- I would link everything.

11 Senator Humphrey. Yes, except perhaps --

12 Dr. Pipes. Except perhaps arms control, under certain  
13 very special concerns. Otherwise, it all has to be linked.  
14 Because a country that behaves decently, obeys international  
15 law, is not going to obey selectively.

16 Senator Humphrey. Well, if the United States adopted  
17 such an approach -- and that is certainly not the approach  
18 that we follow; indeed, the view of most in the State Department,  
19 it would seem, is that we should isolate Afghanistan  
20 from other matters of interest.

21 Dr. Pipes. Well, that's falling right into their trap.  
22 Everything is treated separately, and we should not follow  
23 that policy.

24 Senator Humphrey. Overall, then, given the compelling  
25 human element in the Afghanistan struggle, given the compel-

1 ling element of justice, or the need to procure justice,  
2 given the geopolitical importance of Afghanistan and Pakistan,  
3 against that background, how would you rate the performance  
4 of the administration in dealing with the Afghanistan situ-  
5 ation?

6 Dr. Pipes. Oh, very poorly, I think. It's really on  
7 the back burner, quite neglected. All the motions are quite  
8 perfunctory.

9 I mean, they are good sort of statements by the Secretary  
10 of State and so on, as to what we will not do and what we will  
11 acquiesce to, and that's good. But apart from that, very  
12 little is done.

13 I think the signal sent to Moscow is, after all, very  
14 important, is that we really don't terribly much care.

15 Senator Humphrey. How would you rectify the situation?  
16 How would you propose -- Supposing the President read this,  
17 your testimony, and was disturbed by it. How would you pro-  
18 pose that he rectify the situation?

19 Dr. Pipes. First of all, I think he could deliver a  
20 speech, or a part of a speech, devoted to Afghanistan, if he  
21 delivered a major speech on foreign policy and mentioned  
22 Afghanistan very prominently and not just in passing.

23 Then a number of steps could be taken such as Ambassador  
24 Lichenstein has proposed and others have proposed, breaking  
25 relations with this puppet government, recognizing a government

in exile. This would create outrage in Moscow. It would send a signal. Again, it would have mainly symbolic value. But these symbols matter that we don't recognize their legitimacy. Far from moving towards compromise, we are becoming more uncompromising than ever--it's a matter of principle. These are some of the steps that would be taken. And, you know, one cannot think of any gimmicks, pull out any rabbits out of a hat.

But such measures, speeches by the President, by the Secretary of State, which are clearly devoted to the subject of Afghanistan, and the significance of Afghanistan for the Middle East for American security, and for morality, international morality, plus certain actions, such as breaking relations with Kabul--these matters would go a long way towards rectifying it, and would add another element to the consternation in Moscow what to do about Afghanistan. So if there are people who want to pull out, they will get additional ammunition this way.

Senator Humphrey. Yes. Doctor, you are an expert on the Soviet technique in subverting and taking over countries. How do you suppose they are going to try to achieve their ends--if indeed they have made a decision to try to achieve their ends in Afghanistan through diplomatic means, through negotiations, how do you suppose they would try to effectuate that and what should we be watching for, how could we block



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need not be strung out over months let alone years, just maybe over days and weeks.

Senator Humphrey. Are you saying the only way to prevent the outcome that you fear, a violation by the Soviets of an agreement, the only way to prevent that is to ensure that the Mujahideen continue to receive assistance I guess proportionately as long as there are Soviet troops?

Dr. Pipes. Until the last Soviet troops have evacuated.

Senator Humphrey. Is that what you are suggesting, a proportionate reduction scaled to the Soviet withdrawal?

Dr. Pipes. This would be so fast--I should think the Russians could withdraw pretty much within, what, four weeks? I mean, they came in a matter of days. And if they have plenty of warning on a certain day to start returning, it should take them no longer to get out than to get in; in fact, they should go faster since they are not facing a complex situation.

Senator Humphrey. Yes.

Dr. Pipes. If you are talking about, let's say, four weeks, you know, the stuff that's in the pipeline would not be stopped and so on. So if one says, look, if in four weeks you retreat, you withdraw all your forces, plus all the people who want to leave with you, and after that the people come back; and, of course, there would be no fresh shipments. The thing can be worked out; if there is good will on the

other side, it can be worked out without any problems.

Senator Humphrey. But the State Department has already offered to act as a guarantor of an agreement that entails cutting off assistance to the Mujahideen on the first day.

Dr. Pipes. They agreed to this even if the Russians don't provide a schedule for withdrawal. No, I don't think that should be so. It seems to me--if you get the Russians to agree to a four-week withdrawal--and I'm throwing this figure out, it could be two weeks, it could be six weeks, it's immaterial, but a very, very fast withdrawal--my impression is that the materiel that's in the pipeline would take weeks to reach anyway, so it wouldn't make any difference. And the return of three or four million refugees would take a long time.

So one could say that if you withdraw in four weeks, no more materiel will be shipped in. But during the four weeks not much needs to be done on our side and on the side of the friends of Afghanistan.

Senator Humphrey. Well, thank you very much, Dr. Pipes. It was very useful.

We will enter into the record the statement of Senator Byrd. Apparently he is not going to be able to come. Thank you all for attending.

[The Task Force meeting adjourned at 12:07 p.m.]